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The traditional perspective holds that large firms in our economy use
unsecured credit and small firms use secured credit. Existing scholarship,
however, has provided little explanation of that pattern. In a recent article, I
attributed the use of unsecured credit by large firms to the limited capacity of
secured credit to lower the lending costs of creditworthy companies. This
article uses data from a dozen interviews with small-business bankers to
explain the small-business half of that lending pattern. To the extent small-
business lenders require secured credit, they do so largely for one significant
benefit: secured credit allows small-business lenders to obtain a credible
commitment that borrowers will refrain from excessive future borrowing.
Secured credit provides little in the way of liquidation value, because the
assets of small businesses tend to have low liquidation values. Similarly, it
does little to improve the borrower's incentives, because the lender can
accomplish the same goal by taking a guaranty from the borrower's principal.
As it happens, however, much small-business borrowing is unsecured. I
identify four circumstances that explain that fact: the relatively high transac-
tion costs of secured debt; the declining enforceability of constraints on future
lending (brought on by the ready availability of credit-card debt); the ambigu-
ous value of constraints on future lending; and technological developments in
credit-scoring and early-warning systems that dramatically reduce lending
costs and risks. I argue that those developments presage a marked shift of
small-business lending from secured debt to unsecured debt.
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Finally, I argue that those developments cast doubt on the dominant
academic view that businesses use secured debt as a device for externalizing
risk to third parties. The decline of secured debt at a time when legal liability
risks appear to be increasing suggests that the. transaction costs I discuss
provide greater insight into the pattern of secured and unsecured lending to
small businesses than the ability of small businesses to externalize risk.
INTRODUCTION
If you asked the average commercial law academic what kind of businesses
use secured credit, you probably would be told that larger firms generally use
unsecured credit' and that smaller firms generally use secured credit.2 If you
asked why, you would probably get one of several abstract theoretical explana-
tions that have appeared in the commercial law and finance literature over the
last fifteen years.3 Unfortunately, those explanations are difficult to reconcile
with actual lending patterns, a problem doubtless caused by the lack of empiri-
cal investigation of the pattern of secured and unsecured credit.
4
I recently have addressed the first part of that problem, the relatively infre-
quent use of secured credit by large companies.5 In my article focused on that
question, I used existing statistical studies and a series of interviews with
knowledgeable industry participants to present a general explanation of that part
of the lending pattern. Specifically, I argued that the key to the pattern was not
the size of the company but its creditworthiness. Working from that premise, I
reasoned that the financial strength of our country's most creditworthy compa-
nies leaves relatively little room for secured credit to enhance the attractiveness
of a financing transaction. Because the costs of secured credit are just as
significant for large, creditworthy companies as they are for smaller or riskier
companies, the relatively low benefits that secured credit offers large creditwor-
thy companies lead those companies to use secured credit infrequently.
6
In this article, I turn to the other side of the pattern: the use of secured credit
by relatively small businesses. As with my prior work, I write against the
1. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 22 J.
LEGAL SruD. 73, 89-98 (1993) (arguing that large firms issue unsecured debt so that holders of that debt can
monitor for benefit of dispersed holders of equity); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80
VA. L. REV. 1887, 1926 n.149 (1994) [hereinafter LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain] ("That loans
should be unsecured when they are to the largest, financially strongest firms is not particularly startling.");
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901, 941 (1986) (arguing that
only large companies can "exploit the economies of scale necessary" to issue unsecured debt profitably).
2. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1996) [hereinafter
LoPucki, The Death of Liability] ("Secured debt strategies ... are employed primarily by small,
relatively uncreditworthy businesses .... "); Scott, supra note 1, at 940 ("Most secured debt is issued
by relatively small, young and growing firms.").
3. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 628-29
(1997) (summarizing theoretical explanations for use of secured credit).
4. See id. at 628-30 (summarizing problems with prior theories); id. at 669-71 (criticizing particular
theories).
5. Id.
6. See id. at 668-74.
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background of previous explanations that are difficult to reconcile with existing
statistical evidence. In particular, the existing statistical evidence shows a
relatively muddied pattern, with significant amounts of both secured and unse-
cured lending.7 The significant amount of unsecured lending to relatively small
businesses is inconsistent with several existing theories of secured credit, which
tend to predict secured lending to small businesses and cannot explain why such
lending ever would be unsecured.8
For several reasons, however, the task here is more analytically challenging
than the large-company problem. First, unlike lending in the large-company
context, the existing statistical evidence shows a much less uniform pattern,
with significant amounts of both secured and unsecured lending. 9 That lack of
uniformity makes it harder to discern the connections among the relevant
driving forces. Second, because commercial law scholarship traditionally has
focused on the experiences of the largest companies,' I cannot take advantage
of the analysis of prior scholars: discussion of small-business lending in existing
work is almost uniformly a side issue.
Small-business lending, however, is an important institution in its own
right.'" Although the academic preoccupation with Wall Street and the country's
largest businesses has left small-business lending largely unexamined in the
voluminous literature on debtor-creditor issues, the crucial role of small busi-
nesses in our nation's economic growth' 2 has not escaped the notice of the
7. See James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, 31 J.
FIN. ECON. 25, 32 (1992) (presenting findings of study of almost 800 commercial loans indicating that
about 40% of debt issued by privately held firms is unsecured); John D. Leeth & Jonathan A. Scott, The
Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the Small Business Community, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYsis 379, 387 (1989) (suggesting, based on random sampling of 500,000 members of small-
business trade organization, that almost 40% of those small businesses' loans were unsecured).
8. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 1, at 89 n.66 (acknowledging that his theory of unsecured credit
cannot explain use of unsecured credit by small firms); LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 2,
at 14-19 (arguing that small, relatively uncreditworthy businesses use secured credit because it allows
them to shift risks to involuntary creditors); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of
Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 256-57 (1992) (predicting that the best small, private
firms in developing industries will issue secured debt).
9. See supra note 7 (citing statistical studies).
10. The only major commercial law scholarship focusing on the problems of small companies is
Lynn LoPucki's empirical study of small Chapter 11 bankruptcies. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in
Full Control--Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (pts. 1, 2), 57 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 99, 247 (1983); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 903 (1996) (passing reliance on data regarding
small-business financing). For a study of the costs of small-business bankruptcies, see Robert M.
Lawless & Stephen P. Ferris, Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Chapter 7 Business
Liquidation, WASH. U. L.Q. (forthcoming).
11. One banker estimated that 97% of all bank loans are made to companies with annual revenues
below $10,000,000. Telephone Interview with Carl Forsythe, Director of Personal Financial Services,
and Susan Holt, Director of Business Banking, Home Savings of America, transcript at 1 (Oct. 28,
1996) [hereinafter Forsythe/Holt Interview] (transcript on file with author).
12. The Small Business Administration estimates that small businesses employ 54% of the private
work force, contribute 52% of all sales, and are responsible for 50% of private-sector products. U.S.
SMALL BustNEss ADMINISTRATION, PuB. No. FS0040, THE FAcTs ABouT ... SMALL BusuqEss (1996)
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lending industry.13 The industry's attention to small businesses is best reflected
in a widely recognized effort by banks to increase the availability of loans to
small businesses that traditionally have been underserved by banks.' 4 That
effort has not been ineffective: by the middle of 1996, institutions insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) held more than $180 billion in
small-business loans. 15
My analysis proceeds in four steps. In Part I, I explain the evidence and
methodology on which my study rests. As in much of my prior work,' 6 I rely
heavily on interviews with knowledgeable industry professionals: in this case a
series of interviews with small-business lenders at various banks, large and
small, spread throughout the country. Part I also explains the model of small-
business lending I use to present the evidence from those interviews: a decision-
based model that focuses on the relative benefits of a secured-lending transaction.
[hereinafter SBA Brochure] (on file with author). The role of small businesses in job creation is crucial.
See id. (attributing over 65% of net new job growth from 1976 to 1990 to small businesses).
13. See, e.g., Robin Wantland, Best Practices in Small Business Lending for any Delivery System, J.
LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT., Dec. 1996, at 16, 25 (article by banking executive advocating
commitment to lending to "this most dynamic part of the U.S. economy").
14. Several of my interview subjects made that point directly. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with
Mark Lliteras, President, Business Banking, First Security Corporation, transcript at 4 (Jan. 30, 1997)
[hereinafter Lliteras Interview] (transcript on file with author) ("We are making an effort to increase
[our small-business portfolio]."); Telephone Interview with Michael Stoudt, Senior Credit Officer and
Risk Manager, Business Banking Division, BankAmerica, transcript at 3 (Dec. 7, 1996) [hereinafter
Stoudt Interview] (transcript on file with author) ("Recently, over the last few years, banks across the
country have been looking at this [i.e., small-business lending] as an opportunity, you know, a new
marketplace .... ").
The secondary literature supports those statements. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Glassman, Nonbank
Competition for Small Business: The Race Is on, J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT., Dec. 1996, at 28,
28 ("Over the past several years, banks and nonbanks have increasingly turned their attention to
serving small business customers."); Mark Zmiewsky & Beverly Foster, Credit-Scoring Speeds Small
Business Loan Processing, J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT., Nov. 1996, at 42, 42 ("The vast growth
of the nation's small businesses has been met with an equal increase in the attention that this market has
received from commercial credit grantors."); Sara Oppenheim, Chase Pares down Loan Application to
One Page, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1996, at 12 (discussing efforts by Chase Manhattan Corp. to "attract
more [small-business] borrowers in its increasingly competitive market"); Sara Oppenheim, Former
Natwest Exec to Run Dime's Small-Business Unit, Am. BANKER, Oct. 14, 1996, at 13 ("The thrifts that
have survived are looking for opportunities to expand their revenue base, and the small-business market
is a natural." (quoting Donald P. Schwartz, Executive Vice-President, Dime Bancorp)); Sara Oppen-
heim, Northeast Growth a Pleasant Surprise for 1st Union, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1996, at 26
(discussing rapid growth in small-business lending by 1st Union Corp.); Michael Selz, Financing Small
Business: Some Big Banks Lose out in Small-Business Loan Surge, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1996, at B2
(describing the "intense competition" to make loans to small companies);
15. See Top 75 FDIC-Insured Commercial and Savings Banks in Small-Business Loans, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 13, 1997, at 10. That amount represented a net increase of more than $10 billion in the
preceding year. See id.
16. See Mann, supra note 3 (using interviews to derive general framework for use of secured credit);
Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REv. 951
(1997) [hereinafter Mann, Searching for Negotiability] (using interviews to explain why negotiability is
disappearing from payment and credit systems); Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual
Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEx. L. REv. 11 (1996) [hereinafter
Mann, The First Shall Be Last] (using interviews to support proposal for subordinating priority of
construction lenders).
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Like the framework I presented in my work focusing on large-firm lending, the
model rests on the premise that parties decide whether to use secured credit by
comparing the net benefits of the most promising potential secured-lending
transaction to those of the most promising potential unsecured-lending transac-
tion. 17
To make sense of lending in the small-business context, however, I extend
that model to analyze the effect that guaranties have on the dynamics of secured
and unsecured lending. Because prior scholarship has focused on the practices
of the largest companies, it has not considered the landscape of small-business
lending, in which the guaranty is a major force.' 8 My interviews suggest that
guaranties play a crucial role in forming the pattern of secured and unsecured
lending in this context. Most interestingly, those interviews indicate a role for
the guaranty much like the role played by secured credit itself, a role in which
the most important effect of the guaranty is not the direct enhancement of the
creditor's right to collect payment forcibly, but is instead the improvement of
the borrower's incentives.' 9
Part II, the first substantive part of the study, analyzes the possible reasons for
the use of secured credit in small-business lending. As mentioned above,
existing statistical evidence shows that small businesses use a substantial amount
of secured credit. Part II attempts to use the framework summarized in Part I to
explain that pattern. My interviews suggest that a desire by lenders to avoid
transaction costs leads much general small-business secured lending to occur in
a stripped-down transactional form that I call the "bare-blanket lien," a lien that
extends to all of the borrower's assets accompanied by minimal or nonexistent
covenants with little or no monitoring. Because that transactional form limits
the ability of the parties to obtain most of the common benefits of secured
credit, I conclude that the dominant reason the parties take a lien at all is the
desire to limit the borrower's ability to obtain future loans from other lenders.
Part II looks at small-business lending from the opposite perspective. Given
the benefits identified in Part II, why do we observe so much unsecured
borrowing by small businesses? Why don't all small-business bank lenders use
the bare-blanket lien transaction? Relying primarily on evidence from my
interviews, I present four separate answers. First, some lenders believe that they
can lower fixed transaction costs by using unsecured lending. Second, the
increased availability of credit-card lending is decreasing the effectiveness of a
security interest as a tool for limiting future borrowings. Why use secured credit
if its major benefit is becoming less and less effective? Third, lenders perceive
17. See Mann, supra note 3, at 634-37 (explaining the decision-based model).
18. The only significant scholarly discussion of the role of the guaranty in lending of which I am
aware is Douglas G. Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2263-66 (1994).
Avery Katz, however, is in the midst of a project designed to provide a general economic analysis of
guaranties. See Avery W. Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract (Nov. 14, 1996) (draft
on file with author).
19. For explanation of that point with respect to secured credit, see Mann, supra note 3, at 638-58.
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the effects of limiting future borrowing by their small-business customers to be
ambiguous. Fourth, and probably most important, advances in information
technology are enhancing the relative attractiveness of unsecured small-
business lending.
Part IV considers two implications of the analysis set forth in Parts II and III.
The first is empirical: my analysis provides a glimpse of the future pattern of
institutional secured lending. As I see it, the effects discussed in Part III are
likely to increase-especially advances in information technology and in the
ease with which small-business owners can use credit cards to obtain large
amounts of personal debt to fund their businesses. As those effects increase the
relative attractiveness of unsecured credit, they will erode the comparative
advantage of secured credit and steadily marginalize its role in the market.
Indeed, I think it is likely that in the next decade institutional small-business
secured lending will come to be limited to purchase-money loans for limited
types of highly liquid assets (motor vehicles and the like). Only larger "middle-
market" businesses will have loans large enough to support the costs of
effective secured transactions.
The second implication is more theoretical. My evidence and analysis di-
rectly contradict the dominant perspective in secured-credit scholarship, which
explains small-business secured lending (if not all secured lending) as a device
to shift costs to unsuspecting involuntary creditors that cannot protect them-
selves against the risk of the borrower's insolvency.20 If that perspective were
correct, relatively risky small businesses would be using secured credit with
increasing ubiquity. My evidence of a shift from secured to unsecured lending
to small businesses, however, indicates that the dominant reason for using
secured credit is not the desire to externalize insolvency risks to third parties,
but the transaction-cost savings that I identified generally in my prior article and
specify in Part II of this article. Accordingly, my analysis casts serious doubt on
the explanatory value of the dominant view.
I. NOTES ON METHODOLOGY
A. AN INTERVIEW-BASED EMPIRICAL INQUIRY
Because the decisions I analyze in this article turn on the interplay of multiple
strategic considerations as well as the details of the institutional environments in
which the decisions are made, I decided that interviews with knowledgeable
individuals would be the most practicable tool for obtaining useful informa-
20. The dominant perspective dates to a suggestion in a 1981 article by Alan Schwartz. See Alan
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 30-31, 33-34 (1981). The most recent exponents of that perspective are Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse
Fried, and Lynn LoPucki. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 10; LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra
note 2; LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, supra note 1. The papers by Bebchuk, Fried, and
LoPucki were the focus of a February 1997 symposium on secured credit at the Harvard Law School.
See 82 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 1997).
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tion.2' Accordingly, I conducted about a dozen interviews with small-business
bank lending officers during 1996 and 1997.22 Although the number of inter-
views may seem small, the concentration of the small-business lending market
allowed me to cover a significant portion of the market with a relatively small
number of interviews. Based on 1996 industry statistics, the lenders whose
officers I interviewed controlled about 9.9% of the small-business bank-loan
market.23 To enhance the robustness of my survey, I attempted to make my
interview subjects as diverse as possible. Thus, I included lenders from some of
the largest banks in the country (Chase Manhattan and BankAmerica),24 as well
as some relatively small banks (1st Source Bank in Indiana and Bank of
Oklahoma). I also included lenders from banks with different market niches: a
major money-center institution (Chase Manhattan), some superregional banks
(NationsBank and SouthTrust), and institutions located in relatively small mar-
kets (lst Source Bank in South Bend, Indiana). I also included lenders from
diverse areas of the country: California (Home Savings and BankAmerica), the
Southwest (NationsBank of Texas), the Midwest (Boatmen's Bank, KeyBank,
and 1st Source Bank), the Southeast (SouthTrust), and the Northeast (Chase
Manhattan). 5 Finally, to test the boundaries of my analysis, I added two
interviews with "middle-market" lenders that lend to businesses larger than the
small-business lenders that are the subject of this article (Magna Bank and
ComericA Bank-Texas). The interviews lasted about twenty to thirty minutes
each. A few of the interviews were conducted in person, but most were
conducted by telephone. I led the interview subjects through a script of about
twenty questions, but freely allowed the interview subjects to direct the conver-
sation to other topics they found interesting. To enhance the likelihood of frank
21. See Mann, supra note 3, at 631-33 (explaining why interviews are particularly useful for
learning about the pattern of secured credit).
22. I did a total of 15 interviews, but two were with middle-market lenders, rather than small-
business lenders. As I discuss below, see infra notes 138-142 and accompanying text, those interviews
were part of an effort to test the boundaries of my analysis of small-business lending practices. To be
sure, small businesses have many lending opportunities from entities other than banks. I focused on
banks, however, because the large size and relative homogeneity of the market made it easier to
,construct a sufficiently large group of interviews to get a solid picture of the market.
23. The institutions represented by my interview subjects held about $17.95 billion of the $180.94
billion of small-business loans outstanding from FDIC-insured institutions as of June 30, 1996. See Top
50 Banking Companies in Small Business Loans, AM. BANKER, Jan. 13, 1997, at 11. Those statistics are
somewhat misleading, because their cutoff for small-business loans is quite high ($1 million). They
appear, however, to be the best industry-wide statistics available.
24. According to mid-year 1996 statistics, my sample included five of the ten largest small-business
lending banks (NationsBank, Wells Fargo, KeyBank, BankAmerica, and one lender that asked to
remain unidentified) and seven of the fifteen largest (the five previously mentioned institutions, as well
as Chase Manhattan and Boatmen's). See id. Although that concentration of large lenders might seem to
skew the representativeness of my interviews, the rapidly increasing concentration of the industry
(discussed in Sara Oppenheim, Top 50's Share of Small Business Bank Lending Market Nearing 50%,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 13, 1997, at 11) suggests that an emphasis on the practices of the largest and most
rapidly growing lenders is necessary to get a good understanding of trends in the industry.
25. I identified a few of the interview subjects through personal contacts, but most were identified by
reading items in the American Banker reporting on small-business lending initiatives.
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and unstudied responses, I generally did not provide the questions to the subject
in advance. In a few cases, however, I provided a script of the questions in
advance to reassure the interview subject about the noncontroversial nature of
my inquiries. Similarly, to improve my ability to recall the substance of the
conversations, I recorded all of the interviews.26
Because of the important role small-business borrowers play in the lending
process, I considered interviewing small-business borrowers as well as small-
business lenders. I decided, however, that interviews with borrowers would not
significantly further my inquiry. My main topics of inquiry concerned the
benefits lenders can obtain from secured credit in the small-business context and
the ways lenders obtain those benefits. Although I might gain further insights by
talking to borrowers (as I have done in my earlier projects), 27 my impression is
that most borrowers in the small-business market have a relatively limited grasp
of the details of the system for administering their loans. 28 Thus, borrowers are
likely to have a relatively impressionistic understanding of the relevant aspects
of the process. Moreover, borrowers are much less likely to have a sense for the
big picture-which includes both good and bad transactions-because the
overwhelming majority of borrowers (especially those with a sufficiently visible
and stable business presence for me to identify them as interview subjects) will
have an unrepresentatively low number of unsuccessful loan transactions.
B. A DECISION-BASED MODEL OF SECURED AND UNSECURED LENDING
Because I seek to understand why parties choose to use secured or unsecured
credit in particular transactions, I focus on the considerations that are apparent
to the decisionmaker at the time of the loan. 29 To analyze the justifications for
choosing secured credit, I evaluate the ways in which a secured transaction can
reduce the aggregate costs of a lending transaction below the level of costs for
an analogous unsecured transaction. As I have explained in earlier work,
secured credit can lower those costs in four separate ways. The first is the direct
benefit conferred by the legal system: enhancing the lender's recovery in forced
liquidation. 30 The other three potential benefits are more indirect: enabling the
parties to affect the borrower's post-borrowing activities by enhancing the
26. Transcripts of the interviews are available on request. In one case, the interview subject
requested anonymity. The transcript for that interview is redacted to remove information identifying the
individual subject and the institution for which he works.
27. See Mann, supra note 3, at 631-32 (discussing types of borrowers interviewed in study of
general pattern of secured credit); Mann, The First Shall Be Last, supra note 16, at 32 (discussing
interviews with borrowers in study of lien priority in construction-lending context).
28. As I explain below, small-business lenders have worked to make the system as streamlined and
invisible to the borrower as possible. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
29. See Mann, supra note 3, at 634-37 (explaining why a decision-based model is useful as a general
tool for analyzing the pattern of secured credit).
30. In a forthcoming article, I present empirical evidence to support the argument that the lender's
ability to force liquidation is rarely if ever significant in business lending because of the limited
likelihood that a business lender ever will liquidate collateral by force. See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy
and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1997).
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lender's leverage over the borrower's operations; repairing the borrower's
risk-preferent incentives; and limiting future borrowings.3' I start here from the
premise that parties who use secured credit do so because of its ability to
provide those four benefits.
Before discussing the ability of small-business collateral to provide those
benefits, I mention a major feature of the small-business lending transaction that
was not part of the general model articulated above: the guaranty. As my
interviews indicate, the guaranty plays a crucial role in the structuring of
small-business lending transactions. Two introductory points about the guaranty
are important. The first concerns the relation between guaranties and secured
credit in determining the optimal structure of a loan transaction. Guaranties and
collateral are two functionally similar mechanisms that parties can use to lower
the costs of lending transactions. Both lower the pre-loan perception of the costs
of the transaction by allowing borrowers to commit to repayment with more
credibility and a higher likelihood of repayment than a transaction involving an
unadorned unsecured loan. The guaranty accomplishes this by offering a second
source of repayment (the assets of the guarantor), and secured credit does so by
earmarking a particular source of repayment (the collateral). Despite that func-
tional similarity, the two mechanisms are entirely independent; lenders can take
guaranties whether or not they also take collateral. Accordingly, aspects of a
guaranty that allow parties to use unsecured transactions to replicate the tradi-
tional benefits of secured transactions lower the relative benefits of a secured
lending transaction. When an unsecured transaction (with a guaranty) can
provide the same cost-lowering benefits as a secured transaction, then the
secured transaction has lost any comparative advantage. To put it more colloqui-
ally, why bother to use collateral if you can accomplish the same thing more
cheaply with a guaranty?
The second point concerns the type of benefits conferred by a guaranty. A
guaranty is less likely to be valuable for its direct legal benefit-the enhance-
ment of the borrower's credit strength-than for its indirect effect on the
borrower's incentives. Specifically, as I explain in detail below, the guaranty
substantially mitigates problems arising from the borrower's excessively risk-
preferent incentives.32 By enhancing the likelihood that the principal of the
borrower will be held personally responsible for any unfortunate business
reverses, the guaranty enhances the likelihood that the principal will operate the
borrowing business with due respect for risk.
31. See Mann, supra note 3, at 638-58 (outlining general benefits of secured lending).
32. Id. at 649-50 (discussing how loan transaction causes the borrower to have excessive appetite for
risk).
33. As Douglas Baird puts it: "[T]he institutional lender does not use the guarantee as a means of
recovering what it is owed. The security interest is best seen as a hostage-taking device. The
institutional lender wants to ensure that the owner-manager pays attention to its interests in times of
financial distress." Baird, supra note 18, at 2263 (citation omitted); see also Katz, supra note 18
(arguing that the guarantor's superior monitoring ability is one of the principal motivations for
guarantied transactions). That analysis of the guaranty directly parallels an analysis of secured credit I
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II. WHY SECURED CREDIT?
This Part analyzes five possible reasons parties might choose secured credit. I
first consider (and reject) the possibility that a general market failure deprives
the small-business borrower of any realistic choice in the matter. I then consider
the four reasons identified in my general model of secured credit: enhancing the
lender's recovery in forced liquidation; enhancing the lender's leverage over the
borrower's operations; repairing the borrower's risk-preferent incentives; and
limiting future borrowings. Although all five of those reasons undoubtedly play
some role in small-business lending, my research suggests that the most preva-
lent motivation for the use of collateral is the last consideration: limiting the
borrower's ability to obtain funds from future lenders.
A. MARKET FAILURE: DO THEY HAVE A CHOICE?
The first question to ask is whether the frequent use of collateral in the
small-business arena is the result of rational choice. After all, it is at least
logically possible that small-business borrowers grant collateral for reasons not
wholly reducible to utility-maximizing considerations. Perhaps the willingness
of small businesses to grant collateral to their lenders rests on some combina-
tion of custom and lack of bargaining power: borrowers grant collateral to their
lenders because the lenders ask for it and because the borrowers have no
realistic alternative.34 The plausibility of that scenario is buttressed by the
relative levels of sophistication of the parties. Many small-business owners have
relatively limited financial expertise. They might be ill-prepared to evaluate
with care the costs and benefits of alternative secured and unsecured lending
transactions. If that were the case, banks could obtain collateral without due
regard for any burdens the transaction might impose on the borrower, because
the borrower would not be evaluating those burdens accurately in deciding
whether to accept the terms proffered by the bank.35
Whatever truth there might be to that scenario in some cases, two obvious
facts lead to the conclusion that it is not useful in explaining the general use of
secured credit in small-business lending: the ready availability of unsecured
credit from banks, and the wide variety of financing options other than bank
loans.
1. Unsecured Bank Loans
The first problem with the suggestion that small businesses lack any realistic
alternative to secured bank loans is the massive amount of unsecured bank
offered in earlier work. See Mann, supra note 3, at 649-58 (arguing that one of secured credit's main
benefits is its ability to repair borrower's risk-preferent incentives).
34. See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2043 (1994) ("[M]any borrowers
cannot obtain credit without giving security ....").
35. See Mann, supra note 3, at 673 (suggesting that more sophisticated borrowers might be more
averse to secured credit because they are more sensitive to its costs).
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lending to small businesses. For example, one of the most prominent bank
lending programs of the last few years is Wells Fargo's BusinessLine program,
which offers unsecured debt to small businesses nationwide. Relying on pub-
licly available credit information analogous to the information credit-card issu-
ers use in preapproving potential credit-card customers, Wells Fargo identifies
large numbers of small businesses that are potential loan customers. It then
sends unsolicited mailings to those businesses offering a hassle-free unsecured
line of credit, ranging from $5,000 to $75,000, requiring only a one-page
mail-in application. Because the borrower's signature on the application in-
cludes a promise to repay funds advanced under the line and a personal
guaranty of that obligation, the signature on the application completes the
documentation process. There are no separate promissory notes, guaranties,
loan agreements, or financing statements.36
Those mailings have enabled the BusinessLine program to create a large
portfolio that gives Wells Fargo a nationwide presence in the small-business
lending market.37 Competing lenders (many of whom require collateral) doubt
Wells Fargo's ability to cut significantly into their market share, and are quick to
point out that Wells Fargo's loans are more expensive than more conventional,
individually priced small-business loans.38 Nonetheless, Wells Fargo has tapped
into a significant preference of many small-business owners. The small-business
lending program brought Wells Fargo $1.4 billion in new loans in 199539 and
has increased its total portfolio of unsecured small-business loans to about $3
billion.40 Apparently, many small-business owners are happy to pay more for
money that comes with fewer strings attached.4'
36. My description of the BusinessLine program is based on a set of sample documentation
generously provided to me by Wells Fargo, a telephone interview with a senior lender at Wells Fargo,
see Telephone Interview with Michael R. James, Executive Vice-President, Wells Fargo, transcript at
2-5 (Mar. 5, 1997) [hereinafter James Interview] (transcript on file with author), and two news articles
describing the program, see Sara Oppenheim, Wells' Small-Business Lending Via Mail Pays Off, Am.
BANKER, Dec. 23, 1996, at 10 (discussing Wells Fargo's mail-out program); Michael Selz, Struggling
Entrepreneurs Find Bankers More Willing to Lend, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B 1 (same).
37. See Oppenheim, supra note 24, at 1, 9 (reporting that Wells Fargo's small-business portfolio
grew by 110% between June 1995 and June 1996, making it the second largest small-business bank
lender).
38. See Interview with Carmen Mastroianni, Senior Vice-President, Chase Manhattan Corp., tran-
script at 9-10 (Nov. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Mastroianni Interview] (transcript on file with author)
(explaining that Chase Manhattan's regular small-business program was offering loans to small
businesses at the prime rate, several points lower than rate on Wells Fargo's standardized mail-out
program).
39. See Selz, supra note 36, at B 1.
40. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 5.
41. See Sara Oppenheim, Bank Financing up, Loans from Relatives down, AM. BANKER, Mar. 10,
1997, at 5 (reporting survey by National Federation of Independent Businesses indicating that "collat-
eral arrangements" are among small-business borrowers' "top concerns when shopping for a loan").
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Nor is it easy to dismiss Wells Fargo's program as an odd fad that will pass
when cooler heads prevail. On the contrary, other major players recognize the
desire of borrowers for hassle-free lending and have begun to follow suit.
42
Most prominently, two of the largest lenders in my study-BankAmerica and
Chase Manhattan-have altered their small-business lending programs to elimi-
nate the use of collateral from large segments of their programs. The borrowers
eligible for those unsecured loans are selected not because they are the safest or
most creditworthy borrowers in the portfolio. Rather, those programs extend
unsecured loans to all borrowers in the portfolio whose loans are under
$100,000.43 If that sounds like a small segment of the market, consider that it is
more than half of BankAmerica's business banking portfolio and represents
more than a billion dollars at that institution alone.44 Finally, even banks that
typically take collateral on small-business loans make a substantial number of
those loans without taking a lien.45 Whatever the reasons for the trend toward
unsecured small-business lending (and I have much to say about that below),
the trend demonstrates that small-business borrowers have an opportunity to
borrow unsecured from a bank if that is what they prefer.
42. Indeed, I argue in Part IV that much, if not all, small-business lending will become unsecured in
the next few years.
43. See Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 1, 5 (stating that his institution does not take
security interests on loans under $100,000); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 6 (stating that his bank
"never" files financing statements on loans below $50,000 and "rare[ly]" -does so on loans under
$100,000); see also James Interview, supra note 36, at 3 (explaining that the policy of not taking
collateral does not depend on the credit profile of the particular borrower).
44. See Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 3, 9 (stating that 60% of his bank's $2 billion
business-banking portfolio is in unsecured small-business loans); see also Mastroianni Interview, supra
note 38, at 1, 5 (stating that unsecured loans below $100,000 constitute the "vast majority-I would
say over 80%" of portfolio that he manages, but stating that competitive concerns made him unwilling
to estimate total size of portfolio).
45. See Telephone Interview with Marc Angle, Senior Vice-President, SouthTrust Bank, transcript at
1 (Dec. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Angle Interview] (transcript on file with author) ("We will look at
unsecured lines or loans, although those are a lot harder for us to do."); Telephone Interview with Joe
DeKunder, Vice-President, NationsBank of Texas, N.A., transcript at 1 (June 12, 1996) [hereinafter
DeKunder Interview] (transcript on file with author) (mentioning unsecured small-business loans
available from NationsBank); Telephone Interview with Anonymous East-Coast Lender, transcript at 1
(Nov. 18, 1996) [hereinafter East-Coast Lender Interview] (transcript on file with author) ("We tend to
discourage unsecured loans, except in smaller amounts and to very solid companies."); Forsythe/Holt
Interview, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that Home Savings offers both secured and unsecured loans for
small businesses); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 2 (describing his institution as "principally a
secured lender" (emphasis added)); Telephone Interview with James D. Magera, Vice-President, 1st
Source Bank, transcript at 2 (July 17, 1996) [hereinafter Magera interview] (transcript on file with
author) ("The lion's share [of our loans] would be secured. If someone has a strong net worth,
obviously they might qualify for unsecured .... ); Telephone Interview with Sergio Ora, National
Credit Administrator for Small Business, KeyBank, N.A., transcript at 2, 4-5 (Feb. 4, 1997) [hereinafter
Ora Interview] (transcript on file with author) (stating that unsecured loans are "more exceptions rather
than the norm" and explaining the circumstances in which his institution makes unsecured loans). As
those comments suggest, many of those institutions limit their unsecured lending to borrowers identified as the
most creditworthy in the portfolio. Thus, unsecured lending from those banks is not available to the broad
spectrum of borrowers that can get unsecured lending from the other banks discussed in the text.
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2. Financing Other Than Bank Loans.
Small businesses also have ready alternatives to bank loans as ways to satisfy
their financing needs. As recently as 1987, 24% of small businesses used no
bank financing whatsoever.46 Although recent initiatives have increased the
market share held by banks, the competing opportunities remain significant. For
example, even though 83% of small businesses now borrow some money from
banks, only 34% use banks as the primary source of working capital.47 Personal
savings aside, the most visible borrowing alternative is credit-card debt;
48
current market conditions make it relatively easy for entrepreneurs to use credit
cards to borrow tens of thousands of dollars to finance their businesses. 49 By
borrowing in that market, businesses frequently avoid the need to grant collat-
eral to secure their business debt.
Even businesses whose financing needs are too large to be satisfied by
haphazard credit-card borrowing have alternatives to bank financing.5" Those
alternatives include such well-known entities as the Money Store,5 AT&T
46. See Oppenheim, supra note 41, at 5.
47. See id.
48. Credit cards appear to provide the primary source of working capital for 5% of small businesses.
See id. For the smallest of small businesses, the market share of credit-card lending appears to be much
higher, in the range of 15-20%. See Rodney Ho, Credit-Card Use to Finance Business Is Soaring, Says
Survey of Small Firms, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1997, at B2 (reporting results of a survey indicating that
one-third of responding businesses with less than 20 employees use credit cards "as one of their
financing options," but that 60% of responding businesses that use credit cards pay off their balances
each month).
49. See, e.g., Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 3, 9 (describing credit cards as competing source of
small-business lending and discussing ready availability of "30 or 40 thousand dollars of credit card
debt" even to troubled small businesses); Interview with E. Tracy Beckette, Vice-President and
Business Banking Director, The Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, in St. Louis, Missouri,
transcript at 14 (July 18, 1996) [hereinafter Beckette Interview] (transcript on file with author)
(describing new customer who had previously funded her tennis-court repair business on credit-card
debt); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 3 ("A lot of times we find these small business
owners have $50,000 to $100,000 of credit card debt that they have accumulated to fund the
business."); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 4 (suggesting that "a lot of times the principals
... will finance the business by credit cards"); James Interview, supra note 36, at 6 (stating that
consumer loans in form of credit-card loans and home equity loans are "the number one competitor");
Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 4 (describing competition from credit cards); Mastroianni Inter-
view, supra note 38, at 2 (stating that for alternative financing his borrowers "would probably go to
credit cards-personal credit cards--or mortgages or home equity lines"); Ora Interview, supra note
45, at 4 (stating that sole proprietorships initially "use primarily credit cards" until they grow large
enough to borrow money from banks and finance companies); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 3
(describing personal credit card financing of small businesses as having been "typica[l] ... in the past"
for customers needing amounts from $2,500 to $50,000).
50. See Michael Selz, Finance Firms Targeting Small Business Are on the Rise, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6,
1996, at B2 ("The number of commercial-finance companies targeting small business is rising as
financiers spot niches sometimes underserved by newly merged big banks.").
51. "The Money Store has been the largest SBA lender in the U.S. for 13 years .... Glassman,
supra note 14, at 12. Actual competition from the Money Store is difficult to gauge. One knowledgeable
executive told me that the Money Store's only significant small-business product is an SBA-supported
real-estate loan. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 6 ("No matter what they tell you, that's what
they really do.").
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Capital,52 GE Capital Services,53 and American Express.54 Equity financing is
also available.55 To be sure, most of the nonbank borrowing alternatives-
finance companies, accounts receivable factors, and other noninstitutional lend-
ers-require collateral. Even so, the presence of those competitors prevents
banks from having too free a hand in setting the terms of their lending
transactions: if banks impose collateral-related requirements without a price-
based justification, borrowers have every opportunity to take their business to
other lenders that stand ready to compete with the bank lenders.
B. THE LIMITED UTILITY OF LIQUIDATION
Assuming that the significant market share for small-business secured debt
does not reflect market failure, I turn now to possible economic justifications for
the use of collateral in that market. The traditional, most direct reason for taking
a grant of collateral is to enhance the likelihood that the lender will be able to
recover its loan through forcible liquidation of the collateral. If the borrower
does not pay willingly, the theory goes, the lender can take possession of the
collateral and sell it in satisfaction of the debt.56 The foreclosure option,
however, has quite a limited value for the small-business lender.5 7
The option to foreclose is least valuable against businesses for which the
primary assets are inventory and accounts receivable.58 For a variety of reasons,
52. See Glassman, supra note 14, at 30, 32 (discussing small-business financing by AT&T Capital,
second largest SBA lender in the country in 1996); see also Lisa Fickensher, Amex, AT&T Capital Form
Small-Business Lending Partnership, AM. BANKER, Jan. 9, 1997, at 1, 22 (discussing program to offer
equipment financing to American Express's 1.6 million small-business customers).
53. See Glassman, supra note 14, at 30, 32 (discussing small-business financing by GE Capital
Services); Selz, supra note 36, at BI (stating that GE Capital has $700 million in outstanding
small-company loans).
54. See, e.g., Glassman, supra note 14, at 34 (discussing small-business financing by American
Express); Fickensher, supra note 52, at 1, 22 (discussing small-business financing partnership between
American Express and AT&T Capital); Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 3 (describing competition
from American Express); James Interview, supra note 36, at 6 (stating that "American Express is
making a big push to get into this business").
55. See, e.g., Sara Oppenheim, In Fight with Nonbanks, More Banks Forming SBICs, AM. BANKER,
Dec. 9, 1996, at 12 (stating that about $4.5 billion, constituting 15% of all the venture capital in the
United States, has been invested through small-business investment companies ("SBICs")-venture-
capital firms targeted at small businesses); Sara Oppenheim, Small Business Scoring on End Runs
Around Banks with New Kind of Stock, Am. BANKER, Dec. 2, 1996, at 8 (discussing small-business
financing through small corporate offering registrations ("SCORS")).
56. See Mann, supra note 3, at 639 (discussing capacity of secured credit to enhance lender's ability
to recover a debt forcibly).
57. See DeKunder Interview, supra note 45, at 2 (explaining that "collateral values for the most part
would not be a factor in [a very] small ... loan"); James Interview, supra note 36, at 4 ("[W]ith these
small businesses, when they get in trouble, they tend to go down hill very quickly because they have
limited financial flexibility and by the time you get to the collateral there's nothing there."); Stoudt
Interview, supra note 14, at 8 ("[W]hen these very small loans go bad-whatever general filings you
might take on assets, those assets are generally gone.").
58. Although those businesses may have equipment, experienced lenders believe that small-business
equipment "tends to be limited to office equipment, computers, etc., furniture, fixtures, stuff that really
doesn't hold much value." James Interview, supra note 36, at 4. Thus, bankers normally rely on
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bankers have little confidence in their ability to recover significant value
through forced liquidation of the inventory and accounts receivable of a small
business. 9 An officer at Chase Manhattan put it well:
[Tihe collateral for these small companies-the accounts receivable, the
inventory, the equipment-generally aren't worth a lot for an ongoing com-
pany, but once they get into trouble, and we finally get to take possession of
that collateral, there's really not much there. That's been our experience over
a long period of time.
60
The practical reasons for that lack of confidence are easy to understand. With
respect to inventory, by the time the business fails any inventory on hand is
likely to be stale or damaged, and thus have relatively little value even to the
borrower, much less to the lender. After all, if the inventory were salable at its
retail price, the business probably would not be failing. Moreover, the time and
expense that the lender would incur locating another party to purchase the
inventory might consume all or a substantial portion of whatever value the
inventory retained at the time of default.6 1
The foreclosure option is even less valuable with respect to accounts receiv-
able.62 By the time the business fails, the borrower often will have collected
many of the best accounts in an effort to obtain cash to keep the business going.
Thus, the number of accounts left for the lender is likely to be relatively small.
Moreover, efforts to collect the accounts of a failed business tend to face
numerous obstacles. Among other things, the account payor can interpose
complaints about the quality of the borrower's performance that, absent the
borrower's cooperation, may be difficult for the lender to rebut in a cost-
effective manner. Furthermore, the account payors themselves might be in
accounts receivable and inventory as collateral for general lines of credit to small businesses. See, e.g.,
Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 6; Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 3; see also James Interview,
supra note 36, at 3 (statement of lender offering unsecured lines of credit that inventory and accounts
receivable are the typical assets that small businesses would have to offer as collateral).
59. See, e.g., Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 9, 10 ("I mean with soft collateral [i.e., inventory
and accounts receivable] there's no value there really."); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at
6 (contrasting the ability to recover payment by liquidating real estate, which "will still be there as
opposed to accounts receivable or inventory, which could be gone"); James Interview, supra note 36, at
4 ("[W]ould you spend the money to enforce that type of collateral?"); Magera Interview, supra note
45, at 4 ("I'll tell you one thing, when a business is going under-if you've got a line of credit for
receivables and inventory, by the time they are out there, there's nothing for you to collect."); Ora
Interview, supra note 45, at 6 ("[W]hen the company gets into trouble, more often than not, receivables
and inventory tend to be not necessarily worthless, but not valuable.").
60. Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 5 (emphasis added).
61. See Magera Interview, supra note 45, at 2 ("I've got accounts receivable and inventory and they
have some value-but whether you can go out and collect it and sell the inventory is another
question."); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 6 ("[B]y the time we take possession of inventory
and sell it, there usually is not much there, and then, forget about the fixed assets--equipment, desks,
computers.").
62. See Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 9 ("[P]ast experience has told us that ... if that business
is gone, so are the receivables. It's just a practical kind of thing.").
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financial difficulty, making collection troublesome even if the account payors
acknowledge their obligation and are willing to pay. As one lender summed up
the problem:
From my experience what always happens in that case is that the borrower
has already used that cash flow and there's not much there anyway. You would
have the receivables that are maiginal or even the ones that are not going to
pay. The timing has to be very, very good for that to work.63
To be sure, some small businesses have substantial equipment (most com-
monly motor vehicles) that banks could liquidate with ease. Banks recognize
that distinction in the products they offer. Several of the lenders to whom I
spoke offered distinct products (with longer terms) for businesses purchasing a
specified piece of equipment. 64 And in that context, lenders do believe that they
could recover some value on liquidation.
65
Because those loans by definition provide funds for a specific piece of
equipment, they cannot satisfy the general capital needs of the bank's small-
business clients. Thus, although liquidation might be important for secured
credit on those loans, it does not explain the use of collateral on more general
working-capital loans.
C. THE LIMITED VALUE OF THE LENDER'S LEVERAGE: EVERYBODY LOSES ON
REPOSSESSION
One of the most widespread benefits of secured credit is its enhancement of
the lender's leverage over the borrower: When a lender has a lien, the lender's
ability to inflict damage on the borrower through repossession of the collateral
gives the borrower a powerful incentive to repay the loan voluntarily, thus
avoiding any need for the lender to resort to repossession. When a lender
repossesses collateral from a borrower, the borrower typically suffers a signifi-
cant loss. That loss is the "spread" between the value of the collateral to the
borrower (which can be significant, particularly when continued use of the
63. DeKunder Interview, supra note 45, at 3.
64. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 1 (distinguishing "hard-asset" purchase-money lending
on equipment and real estate from lending secured by accounts receivable and inventory); Beckette
Interview, supra note 49, at 1 (distinguishing between purchase-money term lending "for equipment,
etc." and revolving lines of credit); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing different
treatment of purchase-money loans for real estate, machinery, and equipment); James Interview, supra
note 36, at 2 (discussing separate program providing purchase-money financing for equipment); Lliteras
Interview, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining that term loans at his institution "typically would be"
purchase-money loans for "a hard asset or a pool of hard assets"); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 2
(discussing products responding to "a specific need to buy specific equipment").
65. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 9 (explaining that loans secured by accounts receivable
and inventory are more troublesome because "[i]t's not like a building or big piece of equipment that
you can locate, and usually won't get away from you"); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at
6 ("Again, the [real estate] will still be there as opposed to accounts receivable or inventory, which
could be gone.").
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collateral is crucial to the continuation of the borrower's business) and the
amount that the lender obtains on liquidation of the collateral (which is likely to
be quite small).66
Two factors limit the significance of that leverage in the small-business
context. The first is the difficulty of exercising that leverage. In the small-
business context, the lender rarely can take advantage of that leverage without
destroying the lender's most likely source of repayment: the business's ongoing
revenue stream. When the lender takes the collateral from the borrower, the
likely result will be the termination of the borrower's ongoing business opera-
tions, especially in cases in which the lender exercises rights under a general
lien on inventory and accounts receivable. If the lender takes possession of the
inventory the borrower may have nothing left to sell. Similarly, although less
dramatically, the borrower's customer base is likely to deteriorate rapidly when
the lender advises the borrower's customers that the borrower is not paying its
debts (a likely step in collecting the accounts). Once the stream of revenue from
customers is destroyed, the lender's chances of complete payment are dimin-
ished considerably.
67
Accordingly, the small-business borrower need not cower in fear of the
lender's ability to shut down the business so as to obtain payment. The
small-business borrower should understand that shutting the business down is
the last thing the lender wants, and that the lender's need to have the business
open to generate revenues to repay the loan will limit the lender's willingness to
enforce its remedies vigorously.
68
66. See Mann, supra note 3, at 645-49 (explaining how secured credit enhances the lender's
leverage).
67. The importance of the revenue stream to the lender's chances of repayment is illustrated by the
emphasis in underwriting on debt-service coverage (the extent to which the cash flow from the business
"covers" the debt service). Lenders often are willing to forgive shortcomings in what they perceive to
be the liquidation value of collateral if they are persuaded that the loan has excellent debt-service
coverage. See, e.g., Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 3 (describing coverage as "the number one
thing we look at" and expressing a willingness in cases of 130% or higher coverage to "go above the
rules" establishing appropriate loan amounts, even if the liquidation value of the collateral is question-
able); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 8-9 (describing cash flow as the "primary source of
repayment," the personal guaranty as the secondary source, and relegating the collateral to a "tertiary"
status); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 6 (stating that "cash flow ultimately" is the primary source
of repayment, with liquidation one of several "secondary source[s]"); Magera Interview, supra note 45,
at 2 ("I've never looked at collateral to repay the loan-period.... I think if you have a good
understanding of the cash flow of the business and the nature of the business, that's really where you
can get paid back from."); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 5 (stating that value of collateral is
"[n]ot very important" in underwriting and that "we basically are focused more on the cash flow and
the guarantors" and that "[c]ollateral, for the kind of lending that I do, is not critical.").
68. The preceding two paragraphs summarize a point that I make at greater length in a forthcoming
article that reports the results of a series of case studies of the practices of lenders in liquidating secured
loans. Those studies provide empirical support for a surprising reluctance on the part of lenders to take
possession of the collateral of their borrowers, based on a general perception that a lender's chances of
obtaining complete repayment diminish considerably once a lender decides to take possession of the
collateral. See Mann, supra note 30.
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The second factor that limits the leverage attributable to secured credit is the
ready availability of a substitute device for obtaining leverage: the personal
guaranty. At its best, secured credit motivates the borrower by confronting the
borrower with the loss of its business. The guaranty, by contrast, can motivate
the principal of a stmall-business borrower by threatening the loss of the
principal's personal assets. Given the likelihood that the principal of the bor-
rower will take a loss of personal assets extremely seriously-perhaps even
more seriously than a loss of the business-the leverage arising from a guaranty
should match (or surpass) the leverage arising from a security interest. Accord-
ingly, the small-business lender with a guaranty probably gains little additional
leverage from its retention of a security interest.
D. THE LIMITED RELATIVE BENEFITS OF USING SECURED CREDIT TO REPAIR THE
BORROWER'S RISK-PREFERENT INCENTIVES
Another major benefit of secured credit is its ability to repair the differentia-
tion of the borrower's incentives created in any lending transaction. The basic
problem is that when a borrower runs its business on somebody else's money-
the lender's money in our situation-the borrower's incentives are distorted to
favor activities that are riskier than those the borrower would favor had there
been no lending transaction. Secured credit can minimize that problem in three
different ways: it can allow the lender to focus its monitoring on specified
assets; it can enhance the effectiveness of loan covenants; and it can improve
the ability of the lender to use leverage to police unduly risky decisions.69
Those mechanisms, however, do not provide a strong basis for use of secured
credit in the small-business context. First, in that context such mechanisms are
generally ineffective. Second, a personal guaranty serves as a readily available
substitute to secured credit.
1. The Ineffectiveness of Secured Credit for Repairing Incentives
Although the incentive-repairing effects of secured credit seem to provide
one of the principal reasons that parties choose to use secured credit, the
small-business context limits the effectiveness of secured credit as a device for
furthering that end.
The basic problem is that bank lenders do not generally find it cost-effective
to expend significant time or money evaluating potential small-business custom-
ers up front or monitoring them after loans have been made. 70 Lenders gener-
ally agree that a profitable small-business lending operation must use fast and
69. See Mann, supra note 3, at 649-56 (explaining differentiation of incentives associated with loan
transactions and how those mechanisms allow secured credit to mitigate costs associated with that problem).
70. See East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 1 ("[W]e tend to treat loans secured by
accounts receivable and inventory as tantamount to unsecured, given the fact that we don't monitor the
collateral on an on-going basis ...."); Magera Interview, supra note 45, at 4 ("[I]f we've got
somebody that's just basically line-of-credit coverage with some working capital needs, we probably
don't pay a lot of attention to it ....").
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routine evaluation procedures. 7 ' Thus, for example, none of the lenders to
whom I spoke had regular practices requiring appraisal of collateral or regular
inventory audits; few even conducted regularly scheduled site visits.
72 Simi-
larly, even when lenders retained liens on accounts receivable, they did not
customarily require the borrower to submit a periodic update of accounts
receivable.73 The limited willingness to expend funds evaluating potential
borrowers is exemplified by the statement of one lender that his institution does
not even conduct Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) searches on its smallest
71. See Wantland, supra note 13, at 18 ("Banks that are focused on the small-business market are
redesigning their processes to become simpler and more efficient to meet the demand of the hundreds of
new businesses being started each year in almost every city."); Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 7
("You cannot look at each deal and spend three or four days and have three or four people looking at
these deals."); Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 3-5 (describing reliance on standardized collateral
values rather than appraisals and describing how his institution requires significantly less documenta-
tion and internal paperwork for small-business loans); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 7
(discussing "low touch" treatment for loans under $35,000); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 8
("[Y]ou have to understand in a high-volume operation you have to do it in a very efficient and
expeditious manner as much as possible. You can't spend all day trying to [evaluate prospective
loans.]").
72. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 6, 8 (explaining that his bank has no regularly scheduled
monitoring or site visits and that his bank does not require appraisals, but relies on invoices to
determine how much it is willing to advance on purchase-money loans); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra
note 11, at 8 (stating that their institution does not do site visits on loans below $100,000 or inventory
audits on loans below $500,000); James Interview, supra note 36, at 9-10 (agreeing with the suggestion
that his institution does not conduct any auditing or on-site monitoring on its small-business loans);
Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 7-8 (stating that his institution does appraisals only to the limited
extent required by banking regulations, does not audit inventory or accounts receivable, and makes site
visits only as part of initial underwriting decisions); Magera Interview, supra note 45, at 5 ("[A] lot of
our small loans, we put them on a two-year line of credit, we follow the financial statements, but if the
asset is performing, we don't monitor too closely.... I'm not going in there and count every piece of
inventory. I'm going to look at the receivables and the aging list and go from there."); Mastroianni
Interview, supra note 38, at 6-7 (describing practice of doing site visits to audit inventory "[r]arely"
and obtaining appraisals "[o]nly on real estate"); Ora Interview, supra note 45, at 7-8 (describing
practice of requiring appraisals only in the limited circumstances required by banking regulations, and
stating that "there is very little on accounts receivable and inventory policing that we do"); Stoudt
Interview, supra note 14, at 7 (explaining that on loans below $100,000 "it kind of looks more like a
credit-card type of thing, there is very little if any in terms of going out, doing actual site visits or
anything like that"); id. (explaining that his bank "generally [does] not" get appraisals except on real
estate or equipment loans). Those that did conduct site visits indicated that the principal purpose of site
visits was promotion of their lending services and solidifying their relationship with the borrower, not
close examination of the borrower's business practices: the visits are sales and marketing visits, not
monitoring visits. See Magera Interview, supra note 45, at 5 (discussing need to "spend similar
amounts of time" with large and small borrowers to satisfy "all these other needs" for insurance and
personal banking services); Ora Interview, supra note 45, at 8 (stating that he "probably tend[s] to use
[site visits] more for business development and relationship management" than for monitoring).
73. See Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 9 (statement of lender that he does not ask for summary
of outstanding accounts receivable); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 7 (stating that his institution
does not monitor accounts receivable or inventory during the term of general line of credit); Ora
Interview, supra note 45, at 7 ("[At least on loans below $250,000], there is very little on accounts
receivable and inventory policing that we do."); see also DeKunder Interview, supra note 45, at 3
(explaining that lockbox procedures-which require checks to be mailed directly to the bank from the
borrower's customers-typically are not cost-effective on loans below $500,000).
1997] SECURED CREDIT IN SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING
business loans (under $35,000)."4
Nor can small-business bank lenders perform any substantial monitoring of
borrowers through review of financial statements. For starters, the costs of
producing audited financial statements make it wholly implausible for bankers
to seek such statements from small businesses. Thus, although a few businesses
might prepare statements reviewed or compiled by third-party accountants,
bankers are not in a position to insist on such statements.75 Rather, they accept
owner-prepared statements or (most frequently) tax returns.7 6 Moreover, some
lenders do not review statements at all during the term of the loan, except in
connection with annual reviews of lines of credit.7 7 Those practices do not offer
lenders the kind of information necessary to check borrower opportunism.
As a result, the dominant trend in small-business lending, especially on
smaller loans, is to abjure any effort at monitoring whatsoever. Lender after
lender explained that once the loan is "put to bed," the lender will do nothing to
monitor the loan on an ongoing basis: as long as the borrower makes the
scheduled payments, the loan is completely ignored.78 For lines of credit subject
to periodic review, the review often is limited to examination of information
readily available from the records of the bank or other public sources. As long
as nothing reveals a serious problem-a substantial deterioration of the business
74. See Interview with Charles M. Mohr, Assistant Vice-President, Business Banking Center, The
Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, in St. Louis, Missouri (Aug. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Mohr
Interview] (notes of interview on file with author).
75. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (stating that financial statements "[t]ypically" are
prepared by borrowers); Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 3 (explaining that his borrowers
"[glenerally" do not provide audited statements); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 10 ("We
rarely get audited financial statements."); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 7 ("[Tlhey do not tend to
be audited. At best, they will be reviewed .... "); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 6 ("Rarely
do we see an audited statement.").
76. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (stating that he normally accepts owner-prepared
financial statements); Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 4 (stating that he "prefer[s] to get tax
returns [rather than ordinary owner-prepared statements] because they are declaring to the government
that the numbers are truthful"); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 10-11 (explaining practice of
asking for tax returns to "support and validate the information on [owner-prepared] financial state-
ments"); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 6 ("We accept tax returns [and] compilations."); Ora
Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (stating that his institution normally does not get accountant-prepared
statements of any form, but only tax returns).
77. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (stating that "[a]s long as it stays current we won't go
back for financials," and explaining that his bank looks at borrower financial statements only in
connection with annual reviews of lines of credit); Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 5, 9 (indicating
that his division does not routinely review borrower financial statements, except in connection with
annual reviews of lines of credit); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining that their
institution requires updated financial statements only on the largest 20% of loans in portfolio); James
Interview, supra note 36, at 10 ("There are customers that since we booked the loan we've never gotten
financial statements from them."); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 7 (stating that financial
statements are analyzed only as part of annual review of lines of credit).
78. See Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 5 ("We book a loan and we place it on the ... system,
... and we handle it just like a car loan. We don't review it again, we don't do anything with it.");
East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 7 ("[O]nce the loan is made, we really monitor on the
basis of recency of payment.").
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or the borrower's financial condition (such as a foreclosure or other outstanding
judgment)-the line of credit normally will be renewed without further scru-
tiny.79 Indeed, absent a cause for concern, the bank might renew the line of
credit without even asking for a current financial statement. 80
Given that absence of monitoring, secured credit does nothing to repair the
borrower's incentives. However much the lien might permit the lender to focus
its monitoring on the collateral, the theoretical ability to focus monitoring has
no value in an environment where the lender does not monitor. Similarly, the
lender that does not monitor the borrower's assets cannot use loan covenants to
restrict the use of those assets. Again, the dominant trend is to abjure any
substantial loan covenants at all.8' Finally, if the lender knows little or nothing
about the borrower's daily operations, the borrower has little to fear from a
decision by the lender to exercise its leverage to police risk-preferent actions by
the borrower.
2. The Value of a Guaranty for Repairing Incentives
The small-business context presents the lender with a particularly effective
tool for limiting the borrower's risk-preferent incentives that is distinct from
any lien the lender has on the business assets: a personal guaranty from the
principal of the borrower. Borrowers' incentives for risk pose a problem for
lenders; borrowers have an undue preference for risk when they are able to shift
to lenders the risk of losses from decisions that turn out poorly. The paradigm is
the highly leveraged borrower that garners the upside wins and passes on any
downside losses to the lender.82
A personal guaranty mitigates that problem by enhancing the likelihood that
the principal will feel any losses personally. 83 When a lender can ensure that a
business reverse confronts the borrower not only with a loss of its residual
79. See Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 9 (describing procedures for annual review of lines of
credit); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (same).
80. See Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 9 (explaining that his institution asks for financial
statements in connection with annual review only "[i]f the loan is not performing or we see an indicator
of weakness"); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 7 (stating that "hopefully" his bank gets
financial statements in connection with its annual review of lines of credit); James Interview, supra note
36, at 10 (stating that "you can't afford to do it [i.e., an annual financial-statement review on all
loans]").
81. See, e.g., Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 6 (stating that his institution does not impose
financial covenants on small-business borrowers); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 7
(stating that "we don't do these loans with financial covenants" and agreeing with the statement that
there is nothing borrowers can do wrong as long as they are paying the loan). Similarly, the documents
from Wells Fargo's successful BusinessLine program (on file with author) include no financial
covenants of any kind.
82. See Mann, supra note 3, at 649-50 (discussing how loan transactions give borrowers unduly
risk-preferent incentives).
83. That effect closely resembles one of the traditional agency-cost problems that afflicts corporate
organizations: individual representatives of a corporation may be excessively averse to risk if they bear
personal liability for their mistakes. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman, Corporate Tort Liability and the
Problem of Overcompliance, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1679, 1688-89 (1996).
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equity in its business, but also with a loss of the principal's home, the lender
reduces the borrower's incentives for risk. Indeed, given the likelihood men-
tioned above 84-that many principals will place extraordinarily high values on
their homes and other personal assets-the lender that has enforceable rights
against those assets probably has reduced the borrower's incentives for risk
more than a lender that relies on a conventional lien against business assets.
The practices of small-business lenders support that analysis. The lenders to
whom I spoke uniformly reported policies requiring personal guaranties by the
principals of their borrowers in all but the most unusual circumstances. 85 Of
course, it is possible that small-business lenders seek guaranties for an alterna-
tive reason, to enhance the relatively weak credit strength of small businesses.
Specifically, because small businesses tend to have less financial strength than
larger companies, lenders might seek guaranties more frequently from smaller
companies in an effort to enhance the questionable financial strength of the
borrowing entity.
But the evidence suggests that enhancement of financial strength does not
motivate lenders to require these guaranties. If that were the case, lenders would
not obtain guaranties when the principals had few nonbusiness assets, because
guaranties in those cases would provide little enhancement of the borrower's
credit. Conversely, lenders would not seek guaranties when the borrowers had
strong financial records, because the enhancement would be unnecessary.
In fact, the actual pattern is quite different. Lenders to small businesses
generally insist on guaranties in all but extremely rare cases of prodigious
financial strength. No lender suggested a willingness to forgo a guaranty based
on the weakness of the principal's nonbusiness financial strength. On the
contrary, when questioned, lenders insisted that they would want a guaranty
84. See supra Part I1c.
85. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 4 (describing guaranty requirement for small-business
loans); Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 2 (describing guaranty requirement as "the minimum" that
his bank will accept); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 3 (stating that his institution gets
guaranties "100% of the time"); id. at 8 ("I can't think of a single loan we've made without a
guarant[y] ...."); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 5 (discussing requirement of guaranties on
loans for which borrower is corporation or limited liability company); id. at 8 (characterizing guaranty
as more important source of repayment than collateral); James Interview, supra note 36, at 7 (stating
that he requires guaranties "99% of the time"); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 4 (estimating that
his institution receives guaranties between 90 and 100% of time); Magera Interview, supra note 45, at 3
(describing policy requiring individuals who operate closely held corporations to "personally sign"
loans); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 3 (describing practice of obtaining guaranty "[allmost
always ... I would say 99.9%"); Ora Interview, supra note 45, at 4 (stating that his institution obtains
guaranties on about 90% of its loans); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 4 (describing it as "very rare
that you would not get the personal guaranty"); see also Lawrence Gardner, Protecting the Small
Business Owner's Personal Assets-Borrower's Viewpoint, J. LENDING & CREDIT RISK MGMT., Dec.
1996, at 48, 48 ("Up to 99.5% of loans to closely held companies require the personal guaranty of
the owner."). I did not question the lenders closely enough to determine whether those percentages
refer to the total portfolio or only to those loans in which the borrower is a limited liability entity. In
either case, loans in which the borrower's principals are not personally liable are quite unusual.
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even if it added nothing to the credit strength of their borrower. For example,
one lender explained:
The fact that [the potential guarantor] did not have a lot of non-business assets
would not be a reason to make that exception [that is, to make the loan
without taking a guaranty.] Even then, I still want to tie that individual to that
business. Generally speaking, if the individual were not going to be as
financially committed to the business as I am, if they are not willing to put
their whatever on the line, I'm going to be a bit dubious .... 86
Lenders indicated that they are just as concerned with binding the guarantors to
the ongoing business as they are with any financial enhancement to be obtained
from the guaranties. As one lender put it, "I have a philosophy that I want that
owner to be willing to say 'I'm willing to step up and stand behind this
business,' and if someone's not comfortable doing that, it's pretty tough for me
to get comfortable lending them money."
87
At bottom, it is unlikely that the use of secured credit for small-business
loans is motivated by secured credit's capacity to repair the risk-preferent
incentives of small-business principals. Secured credit does relatively little to
repair those incentives, and lenders can use guaranties to repair those incentives
much more effectively.
88
86. Telephone Interview with Michael Stoudt, Senior Credit Officer and Risk Manager, BankA-
merica, Business Banking Division, transcript at 2 (Feb. 6, 1997) [hereinafter Supplemental Stoudt
Interview] (transcript on file with author). The other lenders whom I pressed on that point gave similar
responses. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 7-8 (stating that he would require guaranty even if
principal of business had no nonbusiness assets); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 4 (explaining that
he would require guaranties even if principal had no assets, "in order to keep attention on the
business"); Telephone Interview with Carmen Mastroianni, Senior Vice-President, Chase Manhattan
Corp., transcript at 1 (Feb. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Supplemental Mastroianni Interview] (transcript on
file with author) (stating that he would not be willing to waive guaranty in cases where principal had no
nonbusiness assets); Ora Interview, supra note 45, at 5 ("[Tjhe answer to that [namely, the question
whether he would waive guaranty requirement for principal with insubstantial assets]-personally-is
no. The other thing that I use the guaranty for is to ensure the commitment of the individual-the
owner-to the business and to the transaction.").
87. James Interview, supra note 36, at 8. For similar comments, see Angle Interview, supra note 45,
at 4 ("We like to see somebody stand behind their name and behind their company because, obviously,
we don't want the keys to it, we just want the loan paid back."); Supplemental Mastroianni Interview,
supra note 86, at 1 ("When we get into trouble, where the company runs into difficulty, we find that the
borrower's owners are much more willing to help us when they're personally liable."); Interview with
Patricia A. O'Herin, Vice-President, Magna Bank, in St. Louis, Missouri, transcript at 4 (July 24, 1996)
[hereinafter O'Herin interview] (transcript on file with author) (describing purpose of guaranty as "a
combination of a psychological ploy as well as a financial net worth ploy," so that "you've got him
standing behind it saying 'I won't walk away from it because this is my life.' "); Ora Interview, supra
note 45, at 5 ("I look at [the guaranty] more from a moral persuasion standpoint ...."); see also
Gardner, supra note 85, at 50 ("The personal guaranty acts as a motivator to the business owner to take
a 'personal interest' in repaying the business loan because the owner's personal assets are at risk.").
88. Of course, another possible explanation for the prevalence of guaranties is that borrowers prefer
the combination of a corporation with a guaranty to the simple sole proprietorship because of the
potential of the corporate structure to allow the principals of the borrower to avoid involuntary liability.
See, e.g., LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 2, at 19-23. But the possibility that borrowers are
adopting that structure for the purpose of avoiding liability is irrelevant to my point here, which focuses
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E. LIMITING FUTURE BORROWINGS
The borrower's grant of a lien also can benefit the lender by limiting the
borrower's ability to obtain future borrowings.8 9 Bankers understand that the
legal system will do little to protect a lender from the harms that it suffers if a
second lender advances money to the first lender's borrower in violation of a
negative-debt or a negative-pledge covenant made by the borrower. The likeli-
hood that the first lender will succeed in a suit against the second lender for
tortious interference with its negative-lending covenant is too small to be a
satisfactory remedy.90 Moreover, a right against the borrower has little value
given the high likelihood that the issue will arise at a time when the borrower's
solvency is (at best) questionable. 9'
A security interest is the most effective way that the banker can ensure that
second lenders are aware of the first lender's presence. A security interest gives
the banker a mechanism for giving public notice of its interest in the borrower's
affairs. Furthermore, a second lender aware of the first lender's presence is
relatively unlikely to advance funds that would cause the borrower's financial
position to become precarious: the lender that participates in that financing has
to take its chances on recovering its loan from the borrower that it has financed
into an overleveraged position.92
Nor is that analysis purely theoretical. Several of the bankers to whom I
spoke recognized the borrowing-limiting capacity of a security interest as one of
the principal reasons for a bank to take a security interest from a small-business
borrower.93 As one banker put it, "of course the argument for taking a filing
on the relation between the guaranty and the benefits of secured credit. For a forceful explanation of the
errors in LoPucki's description of the subsidiary/guaranty structure, see James J. White, Ignorant and
Unashamed, 107 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1998) (undated manuscript at 43-51, on file with author).
89. For a recent and detailed theoretical explication of the benefits of covenants limiting later debt,
and the reasons that security can substitute for those covenants, see Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts
and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming Sept. 1997).
90. Lenders understand the difficulty of trying to sue another lender for tortious interference. See,
e.g., East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 6 (acknowledging difficulty of advancing such
claim).
91. In my view, the aspect of a security interest that is most effective in limiting future borrowing is
its ability to give notice of the first lender's transaction, not its ability to give priority to the first
lender's right to repayment. The priority right standing alone has a relatively limited value given the
limited value of the assets of the business likely to be available for liquidation in the event that the
business fails. I thank Lucian Bebchuk and David Skeel for illuminating that point for me.
92. See Mann, supra note 3, at 641-45 (explaining how parties can use secured credit to allow
borrower to give credible commitment against future borrowing).
93. See DeKunder Interview, supra note 45, at 2 ("I think in [the small-business] situation it would
be a control factor in the fact that the borrower would know that he or she could not go out and pledge
... those receivables somewhere else."); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 6 (explaining use of
secured credit to avoid an " 'equity-squeeze' position with another lender" and thus "to control the
entire access of capital that company has"); id. ("[I]t's how you control how many times a customer
leverages their business assets to multiple financial institutions."); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at
9 ("I think the primary [benefit of taking collateral] is [that] they cannot go anywhere else."); Magera
Interview, supra note 45, at 6 ("[If you don't pick up [i.e., take a security interest in] the collateral,
somebody else will and you don't want somebody to leverage twice, which can happen.... If you
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[that is, a security interest accompanied by a U.C.C. financing statement] is that,
if nothing else, it might put other lenders on notice that somebody else has
already got something going with these folks.",94 Indeed, when questioned about
the value to banks of a legal rule that would allow them to receive an enforceable
negative-pledge covenant rather than a lien, those bankers saw no substantial distinc-
tion between the effects of that rule and their current practices.
95
In sum, to the extent that lenders seek security interests from small-business
borrowers-especially blanket security interests-they do so primarily to limit
the borrower's ability to obtain future debt from other lenders. Those lenders
typically omit the covenants and monitoring necessary to obtain the other
significant benefits of secured credit, generally because of a belief that collateral
in the small-business context has such limited liquidation value that the transac-
tion costs of those practices exceed any benefits they provide.
III. WHY UNSECURED CREDIT?
Part II provides an empirical snapshot of the considerations that motivate
small-business lenders to take secured credit. Given the abundant preexisting
evidence of unsecured small-business lending, 96 however, I also must examine
the considerations that motivate small-business lenders to accept unsecured
credit. More generally, if secured credit provides the protection against further
borrowing discussed in Part IIE, why don't all small-business lenders insist on
security interests?
My answer is that the market is in flux; the relevant considerations are
changing, and as they change the balance of considerations shifts increasingly
toward unsecured credit. Accordingly, I contend that the use of secured credit
will decline significantly in the small-business market in the coming years,
especially in the burgeoning market for general line-of-credit lending to very
small businesses. I justify that contention in two ways: direct observation of an
existing shift toward unsecured credit in the small business market, and indirect
observation of four factors that support that shift and should cause it to
accelerate in the years to come.
encumber things at least it eliminates them from going someplace else and maybe overleveraging
themselves ...."); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 7 (stating that "the only down side for not
taking [a security interest]" is that it leaves the borrower free to obtain additional funds from other
lenders).
94. Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 9. That lender explained that he thought his perception was
widely shared, at least until recent developments (discussed infra Parts IIB & HID) undermined the
ability of secured credit to provide that benefit. Id. ("I think generally, in the past, most banks have
tended to operate that way.").
95. See DeKunder Interview, supra note 45, at 4-5 (questioning significance of such legal reform);
Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 13-14 (stating that an enforceable negative pledge would
satisfy their institution's motivations for taking security interest); Ora Interview, supra note 45; at 8
(stating that enforceable negative pledge would serve as a substitute for secured credit in some
"specific areas"); see also Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 10 (stating that his institution might
accept an enforceable negative pledge instead of a security intere'st in some cases).
96. See, e.g., supra note 7.
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Perhaps the shift toward unsecured credit is the most suggestive. Three of the
lenders to whom I spoke (officers at Wells Fargo, Chase Manhattan, and
BankAmerica) told me that their banks have stopped taking security interests on
general-purpose business loans of less than $100,000.97 The prominence of
those institutions in the marketplace-their unsecured loan portfolios alone
constitute several percent of all small-business bank loans in the country-
suggest that unsecured lending to small businesses is more than an odd quirk.
9 8
The reasoning behind those practices is even more persuasive. The officers all
held a general belief that in their market a grant of a security interest provided at
best a minor benefit, and generally provided no net benefit at all. Their reasons
generally followed the analysis set forth in Part II: the general conditions of the
small-business market limit the potential for secured credit to provide most of
its traditional benefits; the only substantial benefit it can provide is to limit
subsequent borrowings.
Moreover, a combination of four practical points indicates that the minor
benefits of secured credit are outweighed by the relative costs. The power of
those points convinces me that the question of whether to use secured or
unsecured credit for small-business lending is not a close call that ends up being
a matter of personal belief or experience. Rather, I see a story of a legal/
financial institution that has come to the end of its useful life. 99 Accordingly, I
97. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 2 (stating that his institution's lines of credit for less than
$100,000 "are almost always unsecured"); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 1, 5 (stating that
his institution does not take security interests on loans under $100,000, which constitute the "vast
majority-I would say over 80%"-of its portfolio); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 6 ("[A]t the
lower end... $50,000 and below.., we never do that [i.e., take a security interest]. Generally, on loans
of under $100,000 it would be rare that we would ...."). Although it is difficult to make generaliza-
tions, most of those loans appear to be the primary capital sources for the businesses, not simply small
unsecured loans covering an overflow above some other lender's secured line of credit. See Mastroianni
Interview, supra note 38, at 7 (stating that his institution has "concluded that most of our companies
just borrow with us"); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 6 (describing efforts to ensure that his
borrowers do not borrow from other lenders, but acknowledging difficulties in verifying compliance).
That may not be true, however, for Wells Fargo's mailout BusinessLine program. The Wells Fargo
executive to whom I spoke acknowledged that his product frequently served as a backstop behind other
lending relationships, which might or might not be secured. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 8.
98. Wells Fargo holds an unsecured small-business portfolio of about $3 billion. James Interview,
supra note 36, at 5. BankAmerica's program has more than a third of its entire loan portfolio in
unsecured small-business loans, an amount substantially exceeding $1 billion. See Stoudt Interview,
supra note 14, at 3, 9 (describing $3 billion dollar total portfolio, including $2 billion of small-business
loans, 60% of which fall below the $100,000 cutoff for taking security interests). If only 50% of
Chase's $2.5 billion sub-$1,000,000 portfolio is in the under-$100,000 range (see Oppenheim, supra
note 24, at 11 (reporting size of Chase's portfolio of business loans below $1 million)), Wells Fargo,
BankAmerica, and Chase alone hold $5.5 billion in unsecured small-business loans. That figure is more
than three percent of the entire amount of sub-$1,000,000 bank loans from all FDIC-insured institu-
tions; it obviously represents a much higher percentage of the small-business, sub-$ 100,000 market on
which I am focusing. Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate statistics on the precise size of that
market.
99. For a similar argument, see Mann, Searching for Negotiability, supra note 16, passim (arguing
that negotiability has faded from use because of changes in the physical environment that deprive
negotiability of any ongoing utility).
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believe that much if not all of the industry soon will follow in the footsteps of
the institutions whose lenders I interviewed.
A. THE RELATIVELY HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS OF SECURED LOANS
Small-business lending typically involves small individual transactions, nor-
mally loans below $100,000." ° Given the small size of those loans, filing fees
and other fixed-amount transaction costs that would be trivial in larger transac-
tions have the potential to become significant relative to the value of the
transactions. Indeed, two of my interview subjects (officers at Chase Manhattan
and Wells Fargo) emphasized that in the current small-business market-with
loans so small and competition so fierce-the profit margins of lending transac-
tions are so slim that the documentation and filing costs of taking a security
interest in fact do become significant. As one officer put it, in a secured
transaction "[t]here are more papers that need to be signed, you have to make
U.C.C. [filings] in the state and county in which the business is operating. Then
you have to renew it every few years. So, it's very expensive. We do 18,000
loans a year."' ' When I expressed skepticism that those costs could be
significant' 0 2-involving only the nominal U.C.C. filing fee and the costs of
signing a few more pieces of paper-he insisted that his transactions were so
tight that those costs were a significant factor weighing against a lender's
insistence on a security interest. '
0 3
B. DECLINING CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE BORROWING
The second point undermining the value of security interests in the small-
business context is the increasing feebleness of a security interest's ability to
limit future borrowing. Several lenders mentioned the ready ability of their
borrowers to obtain additional funds through credit-card borrowingi1 4 Given
the typical underwriting practices of credit-card issuers, the existence of a lien
on the borrower's business assets is unlikely to stop credit-card issuers from
offering credit to the small-business owner. Indeed, credit-card issuers may not
even be aware of the lien. In any event, the lenders to whom I spoke believed
that their borrowers easily can obtain substantial amounts of funds for their
businesses from credit-card borrowings, notwithstanding the bank lender's lien
100. 1 have to admit that I was surprised at the uniform $100,000 ceiling selected by the three
institutions I interviewed that have large, completely unsecured small-business loan portfolios.
101. Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 7.
102. I previously have argued that these costs are generally not significant. Mann, supra note 3, at
661-63.
103. "Mann: And you're saying on loans that you do, it's actually a significant expense to do that
stuff? Mastroianni: Yes, it is." Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 8. I heard a similar perspective
from a Wells Fargo executive. When I asked him to explain a statement that it was "too expensive to
take collateral there [i.e., in the sub-S 100,000 market]," he stated simply: "It's the costs of document-
ing and filing." James Interview, supra note 36, at 3.
104. See supra note 49.
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on the business assets." 5 Remember, the businesses in that market are operating
on a line of credit with a maximum amount of less than $100,000. Given the
ease with which relatively solvent individuals can borrow tens of thousands of
dollars on credit cards, credit-card debt often can increase the funds available to
the business significantly beyond the amount available from the bank. 
0 6
C. THE AMBIGUOUS VALUE OF CONSTRAINTS ON FUTURE BORROWING
The third point undermining the use of secured credit is the ambiguous value
of the restriction on subsequent lending. One lender argued to me cogently that
the ability of the first lender to limit subsequent borrowings does not materially
aid the first lender's chances of recovering its debt. His point is that, even in
cases in which the borrower is in sufficiently desperate straits to want to obtain
money from a future lender, it is unclear that the consequences of the first
bank's willingness to forgo a security interest will be negative. Several sce-
narios are possible, most of which do not harm the first lender's position.
The first scenario is perhaps the most likely: with or without the lien, the
borrower's condition will be so poor that the second lender will be unwilling to
advance substantial new funds to the borrower. In that event, the absence of the
lien has no effect. In the second scenario, the second lender advances funds to
the borrower in return for a security interest in the borrower's assets, and the
infusion of new funds saves the business, thus resuscitating the first lender's
chances of repayment. 10 7 Here, the absence of the lien indeed might be positive
because it lowers the transaction costs of the second lender's transaction; the
second lender doubtless would be more cautious about advancing new funds
behind an existing lien than it would be about advancing new funds to a
borrower with outstanding unsecured debt.
The third scenario is the only instance in which the absence of a security
interest puts the first lender at risk: the new lender advances funds to the
borrower but the borrower still fails. Because that scenario suggests a serious
loss following a voluntary decision by two successive lenders to advance funds
to the borrower, it probably is the least likely scenario. Moreover, even in that
circumstance the effect on the first lender is not unambiguouisly negative. If the
borrower's business is so weak that a second loan cannot resuscitate it, it is
highly likely that the first lender would have taken a substantial loss on its loan
even if it had retained a security interest. For the reasons discussed above, the
105. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 9 (explaining that his ability to prevent his borrowers
from "overleverag[ing] themselves" is hindered by the ready availability of credit-card consumer debt
to principals of his borrowers).
106. See, e.g., id. at 9 (suggesting that the principals of distressed small-business borrowers
frequently have $30,000-$40,000 of credit-card debt); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 3
("A lot of times we find these small-business owners have $50,000 to $100,000 of credit-card debt that
they have accumulated to fund the business."); Ho, supra note 48, at B2 (reporting similar anecdotes).
107. See Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 8 ("[Blest case scenario, the money that they lent
you will keep you afloat and allow you to continue paying my loan.").
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value of a security interest as a way of securing repayment through liquidation
is quite limited in small-business lending.' 0 8 Thus, the absence of a security
interest will impose a loss on the first lender only if the first lender receives
even less on liquidation after the intervention of the second lender than it would
have received if the business had failed because the first lender's security
interest kept the second lender from intervening.
Granted, such losses will occur-small businesses fail, and banks lose money
when they do-but losses stemming from a failure to require secured instead of
unsecured credit seem relatively unlikely. And that is the key point for the
secured-credit decision. If the losses the parties can prevent by granting a
security interest are small and unlikely even in cases of total business failures,
then the pre-loan value of taking a security interest is quite limited.
D. ADVANCES IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
The fourth point relates to the role of advances in information technology in
the small-business lending market. In particular, two technological develop-
ments significantly enhance the information available to small-business lenders,
thus allowing lenders to evaluate small-business loans more carefully at lower
cost.109 By lowering the general riskiness of those loans, the technological
developments limit the opportunities for secured credit to offer an improvement
in the lender's position. Thus, those technological developments limit the
relative attractiveness of a secured transaction.
1. Credit Scoring
The first technological development is the creation of credit-scoring systems
for underwriting small-business loans. The traditional underwriting process
required an individual lender to assess individual loans based on the lender's
personal experience with prior loans to other borrowers. Three separate costs
made the traditional system relatively expensive: the costs of obtaining informa-
tion adequate to make an informed judgment; the extensive time required to
assess each lending transaction; and the likelihood that individual lenders would
make loans that reflected poor assessment of the underlying risks.
Automated systems available for modem small-business lenders can lower all
three of these costs significantly. Use of the automated system typically" 0
108. See id. at 8 ("Worst case scenario-you make several more payments on. my loan, then you go
bankrupt and the collateral to bank B isn't worth much anyway.... We don't really view the assets as
being very valuable to begin with.").
109. See Glassman, supra note 14, at 28 ("Technology has increased the attractiveness of [the
small-business] market by enabling effective target marketing, streamlined underwriting, and large-
scale operations."); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 2 ("[Automation, scoring, imaging, and
those types of processes will help bring down the costs of delivering these types of products."); Stoudt
Interview, supra note 14, at 8 ("Computers don't make the business-but they certainly help....
[C]omputers give us that extra horsepower to be able to do a lot of stuff quickly.").
110. My description of credit-scoring systems in operation rests on a site visit to the St. Louis-based
business banking division at Boatmen's Bank [hereinafter Boatmen's Site Visit], during which I
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involves a simple application (often a single page and rarely if ever more than
two pages), which an employee of the bank enters into a computer system.''
The stripped-down application calls for a much narrower spectrum of informa-
tion than the more traditional loan application. Thus, it significantly diminishes
the costs to the borrower of putting the information together and the costs to the
lender of evaluating it. 112
The computer system automatically obtains credit information related to the
business and its principals, analyzes that information, and assigns a score to the
proposed loan." 3 The system reports that score to the loan officer a few minutes
later. Typically, the system works from a presumption that the officer will
approve loan requests above a certain score, reject loan requests below a certain
score, and exercise discretion on approving or rejecting loan requests within a
certain middle range.
1 14
observed a loan officer processing applications with a credit scoring system. Several of my interviews
also provided information about credit scoring in their particular institutions. See Angle Interview,
supra note 45, at 3, 7 (describing credit-scoring process for small-business loans); Beckette Interview,
supra note 49, at 12-13 (same); East-Coast Lender Interview, supra note 45, at 4 (same); Forsythe/Holt
Interview, supra note 11, at 6 (same); Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 10-12 (same); Mastroianni
Interview, supra note 38, at 4 (same); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 5, 7-8 (same). For a useful
secondary source on credit scoring systems, see Credit-Scoring as a Part of Small Business Lending
Process Development: A Case Study, J. LENraNG & CREDIT RISK MGMT., Dec. 1996, at 61, 63-65
(Beverly Foster ed.) [hereinafter Foster, Small Business Credit-Scoring] (discussing adoption of credit
scoring at a regional bank).
111. At Boatmen's, the application would be taken by an officer at a branch, who would transmit that
application by telecopy or electronic mail to a central location that evaluated small-business loans for
the entire system. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 110. For applications over $35,000, the
borrower also must submit a business tax return and personal financial statement. See id.
112. See Foster, Small Business Credit-Scoring, supra note 110, at 64 (noting that none of the
commercially available scoring systems require financial statements from borrowers and discussing
reduction of small-business loan application from six pages to one); Wantland, supra note 13, at 19
(comparing traditional application requirements with two-page application now used by Bank One);
Sara Oppenheim, Chase Pares down Loan Application to One Page, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1996, at 12
(discussing minimal application requirements for Chase small-business program).
113. At Boatmen's, the system automatically orders a personal credit report and a Dun & Bradstreet
report, which collectively cost about $11/application, and then checks corporate good standing records
and fictitious name records. For loans over $35,000, the system also orders a U.C.C. search. See Mohr
Interview, supra note 74, at 1-2.
114. One case study explains that 60% of applications processed using a credit-scoring system are
approved. Of the denials, half are decided automatically. Of the approvals, 25% are decided "automati-
cally"; the other 75% require "an abbreviated, handwritten approval memo .... requiring no more
than 5 to 10 minutes of additional work per application." Foster, Small Business Credit-Scoring, supra
note 110, at 65-66; see also Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 13 (discussing "gray area" in which
loan officers have discretion and reasons why he might refuse loan even if the system gave it a high
score).
Boatmen's, like most banks that use credit scoring for small-business loans, relies on a proprietary
scoring system developed by Fair, Issac. See Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 12; Boatmen's Site
Visit, supra note 110. For discussion of the Fair, Issac system, see Sara Oppenheim, Would Credit
Scoring Backfire in a Recession?, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 1996, at 16 ("More than 250 small-business
lenders use the Fair, Issac system, which was designed with information compiled from the small-
business portfolios of 17 banks."). Several of my interview subjects were among those lenders. See
Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 3 (explaining that his bank uses Fair, Issac because "[w]e don't
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In scoring the loan, the system relies on a database of previous loan transac-
tions that have been analyzed to assess the correlation between the likelihood of
payment (or nonpayment) and the objective information available to the lender
up front, including, for example, the cash flow of the business, the time the
business has been in operation, and the personal credit history of the principal.
Because the system rests on statistical correlations between payment and certain
objective factors, the system limits significantly the costs of gathering informa-
tion to assess the loan transaction. The system is designed to function with a
relatively small number of facts. There is no need for investigation to discover
other facts. The system operates on the premise that the effect of other facts on
the likelihood of payment is relatively unpredictable. Accordingly, the addition
of such facts should have no effect on the decision whether to extend credit.
The system also limits significantly the time that the individual officer must
devote to the loan transaction. In the transactions I observed, the individual loan
officer spent about five minutes from start to finish on each transaction: the officer
needed only to glance at the application to evaluate the plausibility of the information
provided by the borrower and determine if any serious problems were apparent from
the application; glance at the score provided by the system and ascertain the reasons
for the score provided by the system; and make a snap decision whether to accept the
system's recommendation. 15 The expedited processing dramatically shortens
the time to evaluate an application: banks that use credit scoring routinely
process loan applications within one or two business days. As one lender put it,
with credit scoring "we are typically turning [loan applications] around in half a
day or less in the great majority of cases, whereas before by the time we got
done tinkering with them, we'd have spent two or three days at the process."'
1 6
really have the empirical data to do an 'in-house' [scoring system]"); East-Coast Lender Interview,
supra note 45, at 4 (discussing use of Fair, Issac system for business loans); Lliteras Interview, supra
note 14, at 10-12 (same); see also Foster, Small Business Credit-Scoring, supra note 110, at 63-65 (case
study of regional bank that adopted modified Fair, Issac scoring system); Wantland, supra note 13, at 20
(recommending adoption of Fair, Issac scoring system). Only the largest banks have sufficiently large
portfolios to develop scoring systems that reflect their own lending experience. See Wantland, supra
note 13, at 21 (discussing three-year process for Bank One to implement use of scorecard based on its
own loan experience); Oppenheim, supra note 36, at 10 (discussing Wells Fargo's development of
scorecard based on proprietary loan experience); Oppenheim, supra, at 16 (stating that only Wells
Fargo, BankAmerica, Citicorp, and NationsBank have implemented scorecards based on their own portfolios);
James Interview, supra note 36, at 9 (discussing advantages of Wells Fargo's proprietary scorecard).
115. See Boatmen's Site Visit, supra note 110; James Interview, supra note 36, at 10 (stating that the
average time for evaluating an application at Wells Fargo "is probably less than 30 minutes"); see also
Oppenheim, supra note 114, at 16 (stating that credit scoring has "reduce[d] the time spent reviewing
loan applications from an average of 12 hours to as little as 25 minutes").
116. Lliteras Interview, supra note 14, at 11; see Foster, Small Business Credit-Scoring, supra note
110, at 65 (stating that with adoption of credit scoring at Ontarget "[]loan turnaround time has been
reduced from eight days to just under two days"); Wantland, supra note 13, at 22 (stating that
"turnaround time" at Bank One in traditional underwriting process was 45 to 60 days, and that with
automation "the bank is driving toward not days but hours and minutes in turnaround time");
Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 4 (describing ability to make decision on loan application "by
the end of the next business day-at the latest").
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The expedited and simplified loan application process offers considerable
cost savings: money saved by the applicants who do not have to complete
lengthy applications; and money saved by banks that can employ fewer officers
with less lending experience and still evaluate applications more uniformly and
more rapidly. The total amount of the savings is difficult to gauge, but it seems
to be significant. For example, one executive familiar with the adoption of
credit scoring at one of the country's five largest small-business lenders (Bank
One) has estimated that adoption of credit scoring lowers the expense of
underwriting a loan by more than 80%, for a total savings to the bank on each
loan of 3.5% of the loan amount.'1
7
Finally, the system should limit poor assessment of the risks of nonpayment.
Assessing the viability of a small-business loan request is difficult because it
requires considerable experience, expertise, and judgment. Accordingly, any
system that relies on large numbers of individuals to make those judgments
inevitably will experience cases in which individuals make those judgments
incorrectly, in the sense that they approve-or reject-loan requests that a more
experienced or able lender would have treated differently. By regularizing those
decisions so that they are based on factors that have been proven to have a
significant statistical connection with the likelihood of payment and nonpay-
ment, the automated systems improve the "correctness" of the underwriting
process-lowering not only the rate of bad loans that the bank makes, but also
the rate of good loans that the bank declines to make.
11 8
Of course, proof that credit scoring has reduced lending costs does not
directly explain why credit scoring has enhanced the relative attractiveness of
unsecured small-business lending; there is no reason why banks cannot use
credit scoring on secured small-business loans.1 19 For two reasons, however, I
believe that the advent of credit scoring enhances the attractiveness of unse-
cured lending relative to secured lending. First, credit scoring reduces risk. To
the extent credit scoring provides an absolute reduction in the riskiness of
117. See Wantland, supra note 13, at 20 (arguing that redesigned credit process using credit scoring
lowers underwriting expenses from 446 basis points (4.46% of the loan amount) to 76 basis points
(76% of the loan amount)). A case study of adoption of a credit-scoring system by another lender
describes that lender's rationale as follows:
Ontarget's small business unit knew that the traditional judgmental process for loan applica-
tions could not be profitable in cases in which the average loan size is small because of the
time involved and the higher salaries paid to underwriters. The unit's director found credit-
scoring would allow quick and efficient processing of small loans using lower salary employees.
Foster, Small Business Credit-Scoring, supra note 110, at 63.
118. See Foster, Small Business Credit-Scoring, supra note 110, at 61-66 (describing experience
with credit scoring at small regional bank, at which approval rate held steady at 60% and, of 1,800
loans on books for average of six months, only one scored loan went more than 30 days past due);
Wantland, supra note 13, at 22 ("Bank One has experienced lower charge-offs and delinquencies after
becoming a centralized, standardized common-practice organization. Credit quality actually im-
proved.").
119. Many banks do. Indeed, at Boatmen's Bank all small-business loans are secured. See Beckette
Interview, supra note 49, at 2.
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small-business lending by enhancing the sophistication and accuracy of the
underwriting process, credit scoring narrows the window of risk available for
reduction through a grant of collateral: the safer the loan portfolio can be made,
the lower the potential benefits of secured credit.'
20
The second reason focuses on the information that credit-scoring systems use
to evaluate risk. For the most part the required information relates to the general
financial strength of the individual principals and of their businesses. Credit
scoring provides a way to make decisions based on a surprisingly limited set of
standardized data points about the borrower and its principals. For secured
credit to provide any significant benefits, the bank would have to expand that set
of data points to take account of the particular collateral available from the
borrower in question. If the bank does not evaluate the collateral, it has no way
of knowing what benefit (if any) the grant of collateral brings to the transaction.
Thus, the need for evaluation of the collateral undercuts the benefit of using
credit scoring.
To be sure, it is easy to posit cases in which that problem will be manageable-
cases in which the value of the asset as collateral can be evaluated through a
standardized minimal set of data points.12 ' In many cases, however, the task of
evaluating the collateral would require the bank to expand significantly the
amount of data that it collects as well as the time and expertise that it expends in
evaluating the data. That problem should diminish as technology develops,
because incorporating more sophisticated collateral-evaluation techniques into
scoring systems should become progressively easier. But it seems likely that
those techniques always will be something of a patchwork fix, providing a
mechanism for getting some of the benefits of credit scoring, while still giving
weight to collateral in the application evaluation process. Only pure unsecured
lending will allow the lender to take advantage of the full potential for streamlin-
ing that credit scoring offers. Thus, in the end, I conclude that the continuing
spread of credit scoring will enhance the attractiveness of unsecured lending
relative to secured lending.
2. Early-Warning Systems
The second technological development is the increasing availability of early-
warning systems that can provide valuable ongoing information about a borrow-
er's financial and legal position. For reasons discussed above, 1 22 it is impractical
for small-business lenders to monitor the current financial and legal position of
their borrowers.
120. See Mann, supra note 3, at 671-74 (relying on similar relation to explain the rarity of secured
borrowing by highly creditworthy companies).
121. As I suggest below, I think there will continue to be a market for small-business secured credit
in the area of purchase-money loans for highly standardized and liquid collateral such as motor
vehicles.
122. See supra Part l1D1.
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The main obstacle to monitoring is inherent in the nature of a small business:
there is little reliable information about the precise financial position of many
small businesses. Even the information that does exist can be difficult and costly
for the lender to obtain. The information is scattered in hundreds of public and
private sources throughout the country: the U.C.C., real property, and judgment
lien records of each of the country's territorial jurisdictions; the proprietary
records of credit bureaus collecting information on repayment patterns of the
borrower's principals; and the proprietary records of bureaus collecting informa-
tion on the business itself. Third-party providers of credit information-Dun &
Bradstreet and its competitors-have been unable to provide that information in
a manner sufficiently reliable and cost-effective to allow small-business lenders
to use it as a general ongoing monitoring tool. Small-business loans are simply
too small to justify the routine purchase of such reports. '23
With the rapidly decreasing costs of information collection and analysis,
however, some large lenders have developed more sophisticated proprietary
systems-usually called "early-warning" systems-that respond to that diffi-
culty. 2 4 Those lenders create and update their own proprietary databases of
information about financial and legal matters relevant to their borrowers. They
can use those databases to obtain up-to-date information about many significant
events that otherwise might escape their notice for weeks or even months. The
typical system obtains daily or weekly transmissions of all additions to the
relevant information sources, including not only judgment lien records, but
even, in some cases, private credit-bureau sources. 25 If any of those transmis-
sions include a negative item about any borrower in the lender's system, the
123. See Mann, supra note 3, at 643-44 (discussing reluctance of lenders to rely on conventional
Dun & Bradstreet reports to monitor ongoing performance of their borrowers). Despite considerable
inquiry, the only evidence I have found of routine use of Dun & Bradstreet reports to monitor borrowers
appears in transactions much larger than the standard small-business loan. See Telephone Interview
with James R. McNutt, Vice-President, ComericA Bank-Texas, transcript at 1, 7 (Oct. 10, 1996)
[hereinafter McNutt Interview] (transcript on file with author) (statement of middle-market lender, with
typical credit lines in range of one to six million dollars, that his institution uses Dun & Bradstreet
reports as part of its ongoing monitoring of its borrowers).
124. See Wantland, supra note 13, at 21 (describing early-warning systems as a "[n]ew [nlecessity"
for small-business lenders); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 6-7 (describing Home Savings's
early-warning system); James Interview, supra note 36, at 8-9 (discussing Wells Fargo's proprietary
early-warning system and the advantages it gives Wells Fargo); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at
9 (describing Chase Manhattan's early-warning system).
125. See Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 6 (discussing weekly updating of Home
Savings's system); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 9 (discussing daily updating of Chase
Manhattan's system). The Home Savings system does not, however, include updates of U.C.C. filings,
on the theory that new U.C.C. filings would not disturb the lender's priority or the borrower's ongoing
business activities. See Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 7. But cf LoPucki, The Unsecured
Creditor's Bargain, supra note 1, at 1943-44 (suggesting that creditors monitor their borrowers
primarily by watching for U.C.C. filings by their borrowers). Wells Fargo's system appears to be
distinct, because it includes a behavioral-analysis algorithm designed to identify patterns of unusual
behavior before an objective event of distress. Wells Fargo runs that program only monthly. See James
Interview, supra note 36, at 8-9 (discussing program).
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loan officer responsible for that borrower can be notified promptly. 
126
The benefits of such a system are obvious. By providing the individual loan
officer with up-to-date information on a borrower's difficulties, the system
substantially enhances the ability of the lender to learn of difficulties at a time
when the lender can protect itself by reacting to the information. On the other
hand, the overhead costs of obtaining, evaluating, and disseminating that infor-
mation on a daily basis appear to be so large that those systems currently are
cost-effective only for the largest lenders. But continuing improvements in
information technology should reduce the costs of such systems significantly,
lowering the threshold size for making such a system profitable, and increasing
the likelihood that third-party providers can collect such information and pro-
vide it in a useful manner.
1 27
As with credit scoring, the natural question is whether the cost savings
attributable to early-warning systems make secured lending more or less attrac-
tive relative to unsecured lending. Again, my sense is that the benefits of
early-warning systems enhance the comparative attractiveness of unsecured
lending. Unsecured lending provides the lender only limited protection in the
event of financial reverses for the borrower. Secured lending, by contrast,
provides more protection against financial reverses through its claim against
particular assets. Because the unsecured creditor is more at risk of loss from
financial distress, the benefits of the early-warning system should provide a
disproportionate benefit to the unsecured lender, thus enhancing the relative
attractiveness of unsecured lending.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The evidence discussed in Parts II and III paints a rich and complicated
picture valuable in its own right for the glimpse it provides of the practices that
businesses employ to lower the costs of lending transactions. But that evidence
also provides a foundation for further understanding deeper questions. I believe
the evidence has two significant implications. The first is predictive. If my
analysis of the factors discussed in Part II is correct, the evidence suggests a
rapid decline in the use of secured credit as a mechanism in institutional
small-business lending. The second is more theoretical. If I am correct about the
decline in the use of secured credit, then my evidence contradicts the dominant
academic perception of secured credit as an institution that has grown rapidly
during the last half of this century because of its capacity to allow businesses to
externalize the costs of liability to unsuspecting and unsophisticated creditors.
126. See Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 6-7 (discussing monthly reports of negative
activity on any loan in its portfolio).
127. Indeed, the most prominent provider of that kind of information-Dun & Bradstreet-offers
such a service, which at least one of the lenders in my sample uses. See East-Coast Lender Interview,
supra note 45, at 7.
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A. THE OBSOLESCENCE OF SMALL-BUSINESS SECURED CREDIT
The pattern of secured credit revealed by the evidence in Parts II and III is
not simple. Some banks' small-business loans are entirely or predominantly
secured.1 28 Other banks' small-business loans are entirely or predominantly
unsecured (at least when they are below $100,000).129 Still other banks have a
mix of the two. 130 One interpretation of the evidence would be static-that the
relevant considerations are so closely balanced that little or no economic
advantage favors either secured or unsecured transactions. Under that view, the
choice between secured and unsecured credit matters so little that the choice by
a particular bank can end up resting on the "philosophy" of that particular
institution, with neither choice leading to a significant competitive disadvan-
tage.
That interpretation, however, ignores the dynamic character of the market.
The small-business lending market is not some sleepy corner of the economy in
which lending transactions are structured "the way we've always done it."
Rather, it is an arena into which the largest financial institutions in our economy
are throwing tremendous resources, motivated by the perception that technology
provides an opportunity for profitable lending opportunities in areas banks
historically have left underserved.
Moreover, the dynamic nature of the market as a whole is replicated in the
factors relevant to my study. Two of the most powerful factors proffered in Part
III to justify the use of unsecured credit-declining constraints on future
borrowing and advances in information technology-have changed dramatically
during the last few decades and significantly during the last few years alone.
Consider first the ability of secured credit to constrain future borrowing. The
main source of funding defeating that use of secured credit is the credit card.
Twenty-five years ago the credit-card market was in its infancy. Few individuals
operating small businesses could have obtained tens of thousands of dollars of
credit-card debt to fund their businesses, a phenomenon that occurs regularly
today, as repeatedly described in my interviews. Indeed, anyone with a tele-
phone or mailing address is painfully aware of the tremendous glut of opportuni-
ties for credit-card borrowing that have been thrust on any reasonably solvent
individual during the last few years.
The story of information technology is the same. Twenty-five years ago it
would have been completely impractical for banks to develop standardized
128. See Beckette Interview, supra note 49, at 2 (almost entirely secured); East-Coast Lender
Interview, supra note 45, at 1 ("invariably" secured).
129. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 3 (no collateral on the $3 billion portion of portfolio in
loans below $100,000); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 1, 5 (no collateral on the 80% of his
portfolio below $100,000); Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 1, 6 (no collateral on the 60% of his
portfolio below $100,000).
130. See Angle Interview, supra note 45, at 1 (some secured, some unsecured); DeKunder Interview,
supra note 45, at 1 (discussing secured and unsecured loans); Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at
1 (discussing secured and unsecured products); Magera Interview, supra note 45, at 2 ("lion's share"
secured).
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scoring criteria for evaluating small-business loan applications. Only in the last
few years have computers developed to the point where credit-scoring and
early-warning systems are cost-effective. Indeed, even now the costs of those
technologies give the largest institutions a considerable advantage in their use.
Only a massive small-business portfolio will support a completely cutting-edge
credit-scoring and early-warning system. Thus, although hundreds of U.S.
banks are using credit scoring in some manner, only a handful have developed
systems that reflect their own loan experience; the others rely on a standardized
third-party scorecard developed from a sampling of several banks' portfolios. 31
It is not surprising, then, that the only institutions I interviewed with proprietary
early-warning systems were Home Savings of America (the largest savings
bank in the United States) and Chase Manhattan Corporation (one of the largest
banks in the United States). 1
32
Based on the rapid development of those two factors, I prefer a dynamic
interpretation of the mixed pattern of secured and unsecured credit. As I see it,
only in the last few years has the comparative advantage passed from secured
credit to unsecured credit. From that perspective, the small-business bank
lending market is experiencing a shift of institutions, with unsecured credit
becoming increasingly dominant.
I am not suggesting, however, that the trend away from secured credit is
inevitable. For example, a serious business downturn could change the dynamic
completely. ' 33 Consider the ready availability of massive amounts of credit-card
debt. If credit-card lending became significantly more risk averse, that debt
would be much harder to obtain and secured credit again might provide a
credible restraint on future borrowing. Similarly, a pattern of severe losses from
unsecured business-loan portfolios in an economic downturn might undermine
lenders' willingness to experiment with unsecured business lending.
I doubt, however, that such a downturn would do more than slow the trend I
identify in this article. Both lenders and government regulators are well aware
of the risks inherent in the recent run-up of small-business bank lending. As a
Senior Vice-President at Chase Manhattan Corporation stated: "The true test
will be to see how the loans perform in a[n] economic downturn.",1 34 The
131. See supra note 114 (discussing widespread use of Fair, Issac credit-scoring system).
132. Moreover, the market for small-business bank loans is rapidly becoming more concentrated.
See Oppenheim, supra note 24, at 1, 9-12 (reporting statistics indicating that top 50% of small-business
lenders held 45% of market in 1996 compared to only 39% in 1995). If the technological advances at
the heart of the trend toward unsecured credit are most effective only for the largest portfolios,
economies of scale would support increasing concentration in the industry.
133. The ideas in this paragraph and the one that follows developed from conversations I had with
Bob Thompson.
134. Oppenheim, supra note 112, at 16 (quoting Carmen Mastroianni, Senior Vice-President for
small-business lending at Chase Manhattan Corp.); see id. (discussing consideration by Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency of guidelines intended to prevent credit scoring from leading to unduly
risky small-business lending).
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institutions leading the conversion to unsecured small-business lending--Chase
Manhattan, Wells Fargo, and BankAmerica-might be proven wrong in their
assessment of the risks, and an economic downturn might illustrate their error.
But I cannot believe that they will be proven badly wrong. I have presented
substantial reasons to believe that unsecured credit in the small-business market
provides real cost savings to the parties that choose it. If I am right, then caution
and risk aversion on the part of lenders are unlikely to reverse the long-term
growth of unsecured credit. 1
35
Of course, secured credit will disappear from the business lending market no
more than it has disappeared from the consumer lending market.' 36 Secured
credit in business lending, however, is likely to become relatively unusual in the
coming years except in two sets of circumstances. The first is the market for
purchase-money loans for extremely liquid and standardized collateral such as
motor vehicles. In that context, collateral retains two features that distinguish it
from the inventory and accounts receivable that are the classic assets available
for the general working-capital loans that are the focus of this article. First,
highly liquid assets like motor vehicles retain a significant liquidation value that
the lender plausibly can expect to obtain without undue difficulty. 137 Second,
because those assets are relatively standardized, banks can take account of their
characteristics without losing the benefits of sophisticated credit-scoring sys-
tems. Accordingly, I expect secured credit to continue playing a role in those
loans for the foreseeable future.
The second niche for secured credit is larger businesses-the "middle-
market" borrowers-whose borrowing needs are big enough to support the kind
of hands-on, intensive relationship in which secured credit can cut lending
costs. 138 In an effort to test the bounds of my analysis, I interviewed two
middle-market lenders for this project. Both described procedures that are much
135. For an argument that risk aversion by individual bank lenders can affect the market for secured
lending in other ways, see James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37
VAND. L. REV. 473,494-502 (1984).
136. As is the case in my prior work, none of the analysis in this article accounts for the special
features of the consumer-lending market, in which (based on the limited evidence available to me) it
appears that secured credit continues to play a significant role. For a tentative discussion of that topic,
see Mann, supra note 30; see also William C. Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in
Consumer Transactions, 7 CARDozo L. REV. 959 (1986) (providing a general discussion of that topic).
137. 1 am indebted to Jim White and Steve Harris for relaying discussions with car lenders that
convince me of the continued significance of liquidation in loans secured by motor vehicles. See also
Mann, supra note 30 (providing tentative explanation of continuing prevalence of liquidation in
motor-vehicle lending).
138. Although banking professionals commonly refer to "middle-market" lending, the term seems
to have no precisely delineated usage. For purposes of this analysis, it refers to borrowers who are in
between the two major areas of unsecured lending: the unsecured lending to small-business described
in this article, and the unsecured lending to large, creditworthy companies described in my prior work,
see Mann, supra note 3, at 671-74 (describing how unsecured lending is cheaper than secured lending
for the most creditworthy companies).
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more intensive and hands-on than the small-business practices described above. 139
Moreover, even the small-business lenders recognized the enhanced utility of
intensive monitoring in larger-loan situations. 
140
Thus, even in the current environment, there are economies of scale that limit
the utility of secured credit to larger loans, in which the amounts exceed the
needs of the small businesses on which I focus here. Although the lower
boundary of the middle-market secured lending (and the upper boundary of the
small-business unsecured lending market) might drift up or down as technology
develops, I see no reason to believe that middle-market lending will become
predominantly unsecured in the foreseeable future. My evidence suggests that
secured credit continues to provide real benefits in ways that reflect significant
differences from the small-business market.
Before proceeding, I should respond to a concern expressed by several
readers of early drafts of this article, who suggested that my acceptance of a
continued role for secured credit in middle-market lending robs my thesis of
significance. Those readers reasoned that big companies still use unsecured
credit, that other companies (what I call "middle-market" companies) use
secured credit, and that my thesis applies only to unusually small companies
that use unsecured credit. This reading does not do justice to the relative size of
the markets. Although it is difficult to quantify middle-market lending by
banks, 14 1 for many banks middle-market lending is no more significant than the
loans of $100,000 or less I discuss here. Indeed, three of the four lenders that
gave me specific information about the breakdown of their portfolio by size
stated that the small loans dominated their portfolios. '
42
139. See McNutt Interview, supra note 123, at 7-9 (describing intensive monitoring and audit
procedures for middle-market loans at ComericA Bank); O'Herin Interview, supra note 87, at 9-10
(same, at Magna Bank).
140. See DeKunder Interview, supra note 45, at 2-3 (stating that NationsBank does not use lock-box
procedures for receivables financing until loans get "in the $500,000 range"); Forsythe/Holt Interview,
supra note 11, at 8, 10 (describing site inspections limited to loans over $100,000, inventory audits
limited to loans greater than $500,000, and quarterly financial statement requirements limited to loans
over $250,000); Magera Interview, supra note 45, at 5 (describing willingness to omit monitoring on
"'our small loans"); Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 5 (explaining that on larger loans Chase
Manhattan still is "able to monitor that collateral ... [and] give those loans much more attention than
we do the real small loans"); Ora Interview, supra note 45, at 7-8 (describing financial statement
requirements limited to loans above $50,000 and appraisal and environmental evaluation requirements
limited to loans above $250,000).
141. The vagueness of the term middle-market lending makes such quantification difficult. See supra
note 138.
142. See, e.g., Mastroianni Interview, supra note 38, at 5 (stating that the vast majority of Chase
Manhattan's business banking portfolio is in loans below $100,000); Ora Interview, supra note 45, at 2
(stating that 60-70% of KeyBank's borrowers have credit facilities of about $70,000); Stoudt Interview,
supra note 14, at 9 (stating that 80% by number and 60% by dollars of BankAmerica's business
banking portfolio is below $100,000); see also Forsythe/Holt Interview, supra note 11, at 1 (describing
Home Savings's small-business portfolio as having an average business loan amount between $60,000
and $100,000 and a median business loan amount in the range of $35,000 to $40,000, and stating that
97% of all business loans go to companies with annual sales below $10,000,000). The sole exception
was Wells Fargo. Even though its $3 billion small-business portfolio is one of the largest in the country,
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B. THE LIMITED USE OF SECURED CREDIT AS A TOOL FOR EXTERNALIZING RISK
The developments chronicled in Parts II and III also contribute significantly
to our understanding of the factors that motivate the use of collateral in lending
transactions. I consistently have adhered to a vision of lending in which
borrowers and lenders decide whether to use collateral based on the ability of
collateral to lower the overall costs of that lending transaction.' 43 To the reader
unsullied with knowledge of the existing academic literature, that perspective
might seem mundane. It is, however, in considerable tension with the dominant
academic perspective, in which the primary motivation and effect of the use of
collateral is to enable borrowers to shift costs to third parties.
The dominant perspective focuses on the effect of a security interest on an
involuntary creditor of the borrower. If the borrower becomes insolvent, the
security interest enhances the chances that the secured creditor will be paid in
full, and just as surely enhances the chances that the involuntary creditor will
take nothing. Because the security interest decreases the likelihood that the
borrower will pay the involuntary creditor, it allows the borrower to pass the
risk-and costs--of nonpayment to those creditors. If secured credit allows
borrowers to pass those costs to creditors that will not (or cannot) adjust the
terms of their transactions to reflect the increased risk of nonpayment caused by
a grant of collateral to another creditor, secured credit gives borrowers an
excessive incentive to engage in risky transactions.14 4
My evidence directly contradicts that vision of the lending market.' 45 As
explained above, I discern a nascent but accelerating decline in the use of
collateral in the small-business lending market. If avoidance of liability were a
significant motivation for borrowers' use of collateral, we would expect an
increase in the use of collateral, or at least a constant level of use (depending on
whether we believe claims about the burgeoning level of tort liability). 46 In
its middle-market portfolio is about twice as large. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 5. The
small-business loans nonetheless are a crucial part of the bank's entire portfolio.
143. In addition to Parts H and III of this article, see Mann, supra note 3; Mann, supra note 30.
144. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 10, at 864, 882-91; John Hudson, The Case Against
Secured Lending, 15 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 47, 48-53 (1995); LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain, supra note 1, at 1896-1906; Schwartz, supra note 20, at 30-31, 33-34; see also Michelle J.
White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules, 11 BELL J. ECON. 550,
556-61 (1980) (presenting mathematical model of effect of priority rules on firm's incentives to engage
in risky projects). But see Scott, supra note 1, at 908 (discussing that perspective but concluding that it
is inconsistent with the observed pattern).
145. I do not suggest that the dominant perspective errs in identifying the potential for the
externalization of risk. On the contrary, I myself have argued that peculiarities of the construction-loan
market lead to similar externalization of risks. Accordingly, I argue, construction lenders' priority
should be subordinated to the priority of those who provide services and materials to construction
projects. See Mann, The First Shall Be Last, supra note 16. Here, I argue only that existing empirical
evidence suggests that the ability to externalize risk plays a trivial role in the organization of lending
transactions.
146. See LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 2, at 5-7, 14-19 (chronicling common use of
secured debt by small businesses as one of mechanisms that have created irreversible trend toward
"death of liability"); LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, supra note 1, at 1903 ("As the
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contrast, the evidence I present of a connection between declining transaction-
related benefits of collateral and declining use of collateral suggests that the
avoidance of liability is not a significant motivation for borrowers' use of
collateral.
Consider the common use of small-business unsecured credit by borrowers
that have not been formed as limited-liability entities. From the dominant
perspective, it is natural to argue that borrowers can use secured credit or
corporations and other limited-liability entities as alternative mechanisms to
defeat liability. 47 But if a desire to become judgment-proof is a dominating
motivation of those who structure businesses, we would expect to see corpora-
tions, limited partnerships, and other limited-liability forms dominating in the
areas where borrowers have not used secured credit to protect their assets from
involuntary creditors.
In fact, the evidence from my study suggests that free-liability entities-sole
proprietorships and general partnerships-are at least common and probably
dominant among the portfolios of small-business bankers that lend on an
unsecured basis. For example, the lender from BankAmerica who takes no
security interests on his small-business loans estimated the composition of his
portfolio to be about sixty percent sole proprietorships and twenty percent
partnerships.1 48 Moreover, he indicated that the percentage of corporations in
fact decreases as the loans become smaller (and thus more likely to be unse-
cured). 149 Similarly, the Wells Fargo lender stated that about seventy percent of
his borrowers are sole proprietorships, in addition to fifteen percent general
partnerships and only about fifteen percent corporations. Furthermore, like the
BankAmerica officer, he reported a significantly lower percentage of corpora-
tions among the smaller loans that are less likely to be secured. 150 The Chase
Manhattan lender perceived a much higher share of corporations in his small-
business portfolio than did the lenders from Wells Fargo and BankAmerica, but,
like them, he did not think that corporations were more common in the
unsecured portion of his portfolio. 1
51
In sum, the evidence does not suggest that small-business borrowers receiv-
ing unsecured loans incorporate to ensure that their principal's personal assets
are shielded from the borrower's judgment creditors. If anything, the evidence
suggests that the opportunity to become judgment-proof is irrelevant to the
decisions of the borrowers. My evidence does not prove that the use of
transaction costs of secured financing fall, the use of security as a means of shifting tort risk back to the
victims will tend to expand.").
147. See LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 2, at 19-23.
148. See Stoudt Interview, supra note 14, at 4. The lender did not specify how many of those
partnerships were general partnerships, and how many were limited-liability entities (limited partner-
ships or limited-liability partnerships). He noted, however, that the partnerships "tend to be general
partnerships." See Supplemental Stoudt Interview, supra note 86, at 1.
149. See Supplemental Stoudt Interview, supra note 86, at 1.
150. See James Interview, supra note 36, at 7.
151. See Supplemental Mastroianni Interview, supra note 86, at 1.
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collateral cannot have the effect of allowing the debtor to avoid liability; of
course it can (a possibility that would raise efficiency concerns if it were
significant). It does suggest, however, that the costs of liability, and thus the
benefits of avoiding it, are relatively trivial in the universe of factors that
motivate borrowers and lenders trying to finance small businesses.
That conclusion should come as no surprise, given the widely recognized
tendency of individuals to give inappropriately low weights to the possibility of
unusually bad outcomes.' 52 Do we really expect small-business borrowers
structuring their lending decisions to engage in a precise and judicious evalua-
tion of the aspects of the transaction that would be relevant only in the event
that the business fails and the principals face a loss of all personal assets as
well? 153 In the end, I continue to believe that the primary goal of business
borrowers and lenders attempting to arrange their affairs is straightforward-to
identify the least expensive transaction that will provide the borrower the funds
needed for its business. 1
54
CONCLUSION
All things must pass. Economic and legal institutions-including secured
credit and the institutions that make it useful-are no exception. Good reasons
justified the broad acceptance of secured lending during the last half of this
century. The simplification and unification of the legal rules by Article 9 of the
U.C.C. facilitated that acceptance. But there is nothing inevitable about the
widespread use of secured credit. Like all other law-supported institutions, it
will become less useful if the businesses that use it can devise other transactions
that work more cheaply than the law-supported transaction. And the ability of
businesses to devise new transactional forms accelerates whenever new technol-
ogy limits the comparative advantage of the law-supported transaction. In the
secured-credit area, the widespread use of the guaranty and the tremendous
advances in the technology for acquiring and evaluating information have
undermined the traditional advantages of secured credit.
To put it all together, I see the pattern of secured and unsecured credit
dividing the market for business loans into three segments. The first segment is
the small-business segment that I discuss in this article. That segment will be
characterized increasingly by unsecured lending, with pockets of secured lend-
ing for particularly liquid or stable collateral like motor vehicles and real estate.
152. See generally Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 18-28 (1980) (discussing how the "availability" heuristic causes individuals to
discount the likelihood of certain types of events).
153. I am indebted to Dan Keating for that point. See also THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 258 (1986) (suggesting that the tendency of impulsive behavior and
incomplete heuristics to cause consumer overconsumption and undersaving justifies provisions exempt-
ing certain consumer property from forcible repossession by debt collectors).
154. For a more general refutation of LoPucki's argument that judgment proofing is ubiquitous, see
White, supra note 88.
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The upper boundary of that segment will be the lower boundary of the second,
middle-market segment.
The middle-market segment will be characterized by predominantly secured
lending. The boundary between those segments will be defined by transaction-
cost concerns related to size: the point at which the economies of scale of larger
transactions justify the more time-intensive practices that make secured credit
useful. It is difficult to predict how that boundary will move over time. The
boundary might fall if technological advances decrease the costs of the more
time-intensive practices. Conversely, the boundary might rise as the technolo-
gies discussed in this article increase in efficiency and thus decrease the relative
attractiveness of secured credit even more than they have already.
The final segment is the large-company segment, which is characterized by
unsecured lending, with pockets of secured lending by large companies that
have less impressive credit strength. As I suggested in my previous work on
large-firm borrowing, the boundary between the middle-market and large-
company segments is defined not by the kinds of transaction-cost concerns that
separate the first two segments. Rather, it is defined by a different type of
economy of scale-the point in size of firms at which firms generally exhibit the
credit strength that makes secured credit a futile exercise. Although I have no
empirical support for my view, I expect that boundary to fall over time, as
increasing sophistication in underwriting enhances the ability of ever-smaller
firms to gain access to public debt and equity markets. With access to public
capital markets, firms can more quickly exhibit the strong reputation for finan-
cial strength that leads to predominantly unsecured lending.
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